dissenting:

If on April 1, 1990 John Dillinger, Jr. donned a mask, entered a bank, frightened the customers and by written note demanded money of the teller, under the rule crafted by the majority today he may have a *628 defense: “April Fools! I was only kidding. I wasn’t meaning to take the bank’s money at all.” From the novel facts of this case, the majority has derived a rule which invites frustrated bank robbers to proffer a defense theory which makes a nullity of the crime of attempt. Because I believe the result is contrary to the language and logic of § 2118(a), and ignores and conflicts with the precedent of this circuit and others, I dissent. The statute and the case law on attempted bank robbery do not require specific intent to steal; rather it is sufficient that there be an intent to perform the acts that constitute robbery, the taking by force and violence or by intimidation.

Beginning with the language of § 2113, one must note that an intent element is specifically incorporated into some but not all the provisions of the statute. The first paragraph of § 2113(a), at issue in this case, makes no mention of an intent element:

The second paragraph of § 2113(a) discussing entering, however, does specifically incorporate an intent element. In particular, it provides:

These differences are reflected in the remaining provisions of the statute as well. For example, an intent element is specifically incorporated into § 2113(b), the taking and carrying away of bank money or property “with intent to steal or purloin.” But intent is not a part of § 2113(d), which proscribes “assaultpng] or put[ting] in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon,” or § 2113(e), “killpng] any person, or forcpng] any person to accompany him without the consent of such person.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (b), (d), (e).

These distinctions in the language of the statute make good sense and we have noted and confirmed them before. See, e.g., United States v. Klare, 545 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 905 , 97 S.Ct. 1699 , 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977) (per curiam). Because the “entering” set out in the second paragraph of § 2113(a) could be construed as an “innocent” act, the statute requires “felonious intent” for that act to constitute a crime. However, the statute requires no mental element for several of the other offenses described in § 2113, including the acts of assault, killing, or taking or attempted taking “by force and violence, or by intimidation”, because those provisions “describe acts which, when performed, are so unambiguously dangerous to others that the requisite mental element is necessarily implicit in the description.” United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 491 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 , 90 S.Ct. 1355 , 25 L.Ed.2d 648 (1970); see also, Klare, 545 F.2d at 94 (statutory offense set forth in the first paragraph of section 2113(a) proscribes violent or intimidating acts; reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to punish persons who engage in such acts without requiring that the Government prove every element of common law robbery) (citing DeLeo, 422 F.2d at 490-91 ).

Thus, the language of the statute itself suggests that for crimes charged under the first paragraph of section 2113(a), it is not material whether the subjective or specific *629 intent of the bank robber is to take; the crime rather “is his resort to force and violence, or intimidation, in the presence of another person to accomplish his purposes.” DeLeo, 422 F.2d at 491 . See also, United States v. Porter, 431 F.2d 7, 10 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 , 91 S.Ct. 360 , 27 L.Ed.2d 269 (1970) (“[w]here a person has the mental capacity for criminal responsibility, proof that he took property of another by force or violence, or by intimidation, necessarily establishes the required criminal intent, whether or not characterized as ‘specific’ intent”).

Nor does the language of the statute allow for the distinction, drawn by the majority, between the intent required for an attempted bank robbery and a completed bank robbery under the first paragraph of § 2113(a). The crime of attempt does not exist in the abstract, but rather exists only in relation to other offenses. Thus, we must look to the completed crime in order to identify the kind of intent required. In effect, the majority has created a different and more difficult mens rea requirement for the attempt as opposed to the completed crime. This distinction is unwarranted.

We have previously and consistently stated that a completed bank robbery under the first paragraph of § 2113(a) is “a general intent crime, not a specific intent crime.” United States v. Burnim, 576 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir.1978) (citing United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 259 (9th Cir.1975); Porter, 431 F.2d at 10 ). See also, United States v. Smith, 638 F.2d 131, 132 (9th Cir.1981) (noting “[i]n the Ninth Circuit, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a) is a general intent and not a specific intent crime”) (citing United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467 , 470 n. 1 (9th Cir.1977); Klare, 545 F.2d at 94 ; Hartfield, 513 F.2d at 259 ; Porter, 431 F.2d at 10 ). We have also explained that this “general intent” requires that the acts of taking a bank’s money by force and violence or by intimidation be done “knowingly” and “ ‘knowingly’ mean[s] ‘voluntarily and intentionally.’ ” Smith, 638 F.2d at 133 . Ordinarily, the mens rea required for a criminal attempt is the same as the culpability otherwise required for the commission of the completed crime. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 , 376 & n. 6 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114 , 95 S.Ct. 792 , 42 L.Ed.2d 812 (1975); see also, United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 , 117 & n. 6 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977) (conviction of attempted bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a)). Thus, the intent required for attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of § 2113(a) should be the same as that required for completed robberies, namely, “a general intent to commit the acts proscribed by the statute.” Klare, 545 F.2d at 94 .

A panel of this Court reached this conclusion precisely in United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254 (9th Cir.1975), a case involving a defendant charged with attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of § 2113(a). There, we considered whether certain evidence was admissible to show Hartfield’s lack of mental capacity to form a specific criminal intent. We concluded that the first paragraph of § 2113(a) “does not require proof of a specific intent” and therefore, that evidence of voluntary drug intoxication could not be considered. Hartfield, 513 F.2d at 259 (citing Porter, 431 F.2d 7 ). 1 This case is no different.

The Tenth Circuit has rejected a defense theory strikingly similar to that presented by Darby herein. United States v. Lewis, 628 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 924 , 101 S.Ct. 1375 , 67 L.Ed.2d 353 (1981). In Lewis , the defendant was charged under the second paragraph of § 2113(a) which requires specific intent to commit a felony in a bank. The defense theory was that Lewis, an alcoholic, decided to rob a bank so that he would be caught and returned to prison for treatment; thus, like Darby, Lewis claimed he lacked the intent to separate the bank from its money. The Tenth Circuit rejected this *630 argument and concluded that “an individual who enters a bank with the intention of taking money by intimidating employees of the bank, is answerable for the consequences of his actions, if he is mentally competent, even assuming his motive for committing the act was to be caught and returned to prison.” Lewis, 628 F.2d at 1279 . Ironically, then, even under a stricter specific intent standard, at least one circuit court has found sufficient criminal intent to convict, despite the presence of a seemingly “innocent” motive and on facts similar to those of this case. The reason given again derives from DeLeo : culpable intent under § 2113(a) most commonly inheres in the unambiguously dangerous nature of the acts. See Lewis at 1279 .

The majority’s opinion of course, is premised not on Hartfield but on the statement in United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292, 1301 (9th Cir.1987), that a conviction for attempted bank robbery requires proof of “culpable intent.” Curiously, neither Buffington or the later case United States v. Still, 837 F.2d 871, 873 (9th Cir.1988), rely on or otherwise make reference to the Hartfield line of cases. Instead, those cases rely on United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 187-88 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 957 , 101 S.Ct. 1416 , 67 L.Ed.2d 382 (1981) (per curiam), which in turn cites the Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 (5th Cir.1974). Mandujano , however, as noted above, suggested that the culpability required for an attempt is the same as that required for the completed crime; thus, its account of the culpability required for criminal attempts is of only limited utility. See Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 376 (holding conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 for attempted distribution of heroin requires showing of culpable intent and conduct constituting a substantial step). Nor do any of the cases relied on by the majority — Still, Buffing-ton or Snell — provide much guidance on the meaning of “culpable intent.” 2 Both Still and Buffington turned principally on the second, “substantial step” aspect of an attempt and neither involved “actual movement” toward a bank, let alone an actual entry, as is present here. Still, 837 F.2d at 873-74 ; Buffington, 815 F.2d at 1302-03 .

In the absence of more pertinent authority, I would allow the teaching of Hartfield to inform the “culpable intent” of Buffing-ton: a person is guilty of an attempt to take money or property from a bank under the first paragraph of § 2113(a) if he or she knowingly and intentionally engages in the acts or conduct constituting the crime. It is unnecessary to prove a definite purpose to deprive the bank permanently of its property because the requisite culpable intent inheres in the manifestly dangerous nature of the acts. See Klare, 545 F.2d at 94 .

Under this standard, Darby’s actions in the bank, acts which had the effect of intimidating the bank teller, bank security guards and bank customers, were sufficient to infer the requisite culpable intent to take or attempt to take property of the bank. Darby’s actions and in particular, his presentation of a demand note, placed numerous persons in the bank in fear and were strongly corroborative that a taking or attempted taking was imminent. That he intended to get arrested so as to obtain psychiatric care is immaterial. The instructions given by the district court, which required that the government establish (1) “the act or acts of attempting to take,” (2) “by force or violence or by means of intimidation,” and (3) “[djoing such act or acts knowingly,” adequately informed the jury of the intent requirement necessary to convict. See United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 662 (9th Cir.1982). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

The language of § 2113(a) and the teaching of Hartfield make plain that Darby’s behavior on the day in question involved precisely the sort of intimidating and potentially violent acts against banks that Congress sought to proscribe. Willie Sutton, the notorious bank robber, when asked why he specialized in robbing banks replied “because that’s where the money is.” See State v. Zayas, 195 Conn. 611 , 490 A.2d 68, *631 73 (1985). Federally insured banks are not, in any case, where the counselors are. Under the majority’s formulation, virtually every criminal defendant who entered a bank and “created a stir,” however intimidating, could later claim a motive, other than an intent to take, for his or her actions. Because I cannot agree that such a result was intended, and because I find the majority’s holding contrary to common sense and experience, I dissent.

. The teaching of Hartfield on the question of intent has been cited and followed in numerous subsequent decisions of this circuit, albeit not in a subsequent case involving the charge of attempted bank robbery. See, e.g., Smith, 638 F.2d at 132 ; Burnim, 576 F.2d at 237 ; Lemon, 550 F.2d at 470, n. 1 ; Klare, 545 F.2d at 94 .

. Significantly, neither Still, Buffington or Snell employ the expression "specific intent.”