concurring.

I concur in the majority’s opinion under compulsion of our decision in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams (White Mountain), 810 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 , 107 S.Ct. 940 , 93 L.Ed.2d 990 (1987). In White Mountain we held that under Supreme Court precedent, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “enforces federal statutory rights only against direct violations of the federal statute in question[,]” id. at 851 n. 9 (emphasis added). Thus, the law of the circuit compels us to hold that section 1983 damages are not available because the City of Los Angeles did not directly violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). I write separately on the issues discussed in Rubric 11(A)(1), because I believe that White Mountain is inconsistent with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Housing, 479 U.S. 418 , 107 S.Ct. 766 , 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987).

I

Section 1983 reads as follows:

(Emphasis added). One month before the final decision in White Mountain was filed, the Supreme Court, in Wright, 107 S.Ct. at 771 , said that under its prior rulings, “if there is a state deprivation of a ‘right’ secured by a federal statute, § 1983 provides a remedial cause of action....” We did not discuss Wright in our decision in White Mountain.

The Court in Wright did not hold that a state actor would be liable only if a federal statute expressly forbids the state actor from such interference. Instead, the Court focused on protecting the right secured by federal law, and not on whether all persons who might deprive another of the benefits of such a statute are identified by Congress. The language used by the Court in Wright carries out the plain meaning of the language of section 1983. Our opinion in White Mountain frustrates congressional intent.

29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1982) provides that the obligation of the employer and the employees’ representative is to bargain collectively “but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession....” The provision allows free use of economic weapons by both parties to the collective bargaining process. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (Golden State), 475 U.S. 608, 615 , 106 S.Ct. 1395, 1399 , 89 L.Ed.2d 616 (1986). The Supreme Court has interpreted section 158(d) as prohibiting the government from interfering in the collective bargaining process and interfering with the right to use economic weapons. Id. at 615-16 , 106 S.Ct. at 1399-1400 .

In the case sub judice, the City of Los Angeles deprived Golden State of the statu *638 tory right to engage in the collective bargaining process free from third-party interference. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d); Golden State, 475 U.S. at 618 , 106 S.Ct. at 1401 . Thus, under Wright , Golden State would appear to have a cause of action for damages under section 1983. However, because third party interference is not expressly prohibited by the NLRA, the City did not directly violate the statute. Therefore, while the City interfered with Golden State's rights, White Mountain compels us to hold that section 1983 damages are not available because there was no direct violation of a statute by the City.

II

In its opinion, the majority discusses whether section 1983 damages would be available if the City directly violated the NLRA. Maj. op. at 635. Because we find no direct violation of the NLRA as is required by White Mountain, it is not necessary to reach this question. Therefore, I do not join in that portion of the majority opinion and offer no opinion as to what ruling would be made if it were necessary to reach the issue.

I concur in the remainder of the opinion.