Mychelle Davis v. John O. Marsh, Secretary of the Army

The military justice system is independent of the federal court system, with its own source in the constitution, its own rules of procedure and its own doctrines of substantive law. When individuals punished by courts-martial seek redress in the federal courts, the military justice system is thus often analogized to state court systems. See, e.g., Noyd, v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 693-94 , 89 S.Ct. 1876, 1882-83 , 23 L.Ed.2d 631 (1969); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 131-32 , 71 S.Ct. 149, 151-52 , 95 L.Ed. 146 (1950). In this case, we consider whether to continue the analogy: Does the failure to raise an issue in the military courts bar a litigant from raising that issue, absent a showing of cause and prejudice, when collaterally attacking a court-martial?

I

Mychelle Davis, then an enlisted member of the United States Army, was tried in 1981 by a special court-martial for striking a superior non-commissioned officer, being disrespectful to a superior non-commissioned officer who was in the execution of his office, willfully disobeying orders from a superior non-commissioned officer and leaving her appointed place of duty without authority. She was represented by appointed military…