Clyde Stevenson v. Sue Koskey

The relevant facts are as follows:

Defendant worked as an adult probation parole officer for Washington County Department of Community Corrections (“Department”) and had been employed in that capacity for six years. Defendant was assigned to supervise plaintiff, who had been paroled from the Oregon State Prison but who was incarcerated in the Washington County Jail awaiting trial on new charges.

While plaintiff was in the Washington County Jail, defendant went there to deliver an envelope to plaintiff containing a divorce decree and a letter that had been directed to defendant on plaintiff’s behalf. Defendant knew that the envelope addressed to plaintiff was from “Inmate Legal Service, Inc.” but was unaware whether “Inmate Legal Services, Inc.” was an attorney-operated or an inmate-operated organization.

Defendant sought permission to deliver the envelope, divorce decree and a letter to plaintiff but was asked by a Washington *1437 County corrections officer to first surrender those items for a contraband inspection. Defendant complied with that request and the corrections officer leafed through the documents in the envelope. Plaintiff was not present when that inspection took…

concurring:

I concur in the result and I concur in the opinion of Judge Price to the extent that it rests on the conclusion that Koskey’s conduct was no more than negligent and thus did not rise to the level of culpability required in section 1983 due process actions under Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 , 106 S.Ct. 662 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 , 106 S.Ct. 668 , 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986). See also Rinker v. County of Napa, 831 F.2d 829 (9th Cir.1987). Although the majority opinion presents a strong argument on the difficult questions of proximate and intervening cause, I see no reason to reach the issues. The conclusion, shared by Judge Price and myself, that Koskey’s state of mind does not rise to the level necessary to support liability provides a sufficient basis for reversing the decision of the district court.

dissenting:

The majority reaches a simple conclusion. It holds — amidst considerable dictum — that under the facts of this case, appellee (Stevenson) has been unable to prove more than simple negligence on the part of appellant (Koskey). While I do not quarrel with the legal conclusion that negligence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, I strongly disagree with the majority’s characterization of events and its willingness to overturn the factual conclusions of the district court which the parties themselves accept as correct.

Stevenson was a prisoner in the Washington County Jail. Koskey was his assigned probation and parole officer. For reasons not entirely clear from the record, legal mail addressed to Stevenson fell into the hands of Koskey. Rather than sending the legal correspondence through normal channels, Koskey voluntarily assumed responsibility for hand-delivering the letter directly to Stevenson. When she arrived at the jail, a prison guard, whose identity remains unknown, requested that she surrender the letter for inspection. She handed the letter to the guard and waited while he opened and leafed through the contents. Stevenson was not present…

877 F.2d 1435 Clyde STEVENSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sue KOSKEY, Defendant-Appellant. No. 86-4255. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted May 4, 1988. Decided June 26, 1989. I. Franklin Hunsaker, Thomas D. Adams, Douglas R. Andres, Bullivant, Houser, Bailey, Pendergrass & Hoffman, Portland, Or., for defendant-appellant. Spencer M. Neal, Ginsburg, Gomez and Neal, Portland, Or., for plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. Before WALLACE and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges, and PRICE, District Judge. * PRICE, District Judge: The relevant facts are as follows: Defendant worked as an adult probation parole officer for Washington County Department of Community Corrections ("Department") and had been employed in that capacity for six years. Defendant was assigned to supervise plaintiff, who had been paroled from the Oregon State Prison but who was incarcerated in the Washington County Jail awaiting trial on new charges. While plaintiff was in the Washington County Jail, defendant went there to deliver an envelope to plaintiff containing a divorce decree and a letter that had been directed to defendant on…