United States v. Joel Torres Salas, United States of America v. Vincente Flores Munoz

879 F.2d 530 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joel Torres SALAS, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vincente Flores MUNOZ, Defendant-Appellant. Nos. 88-3221, 88-3228. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted May 1, 1989. Decided June 19, 1989. Michael P. Ruark, Breskin & Robbins, Seattle, Wash., for defendant-appellant, Joel Torres Salas. William T. Hines, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Seattle, Wash., for defendant-appellant, Vincente Flores Munoz. Jerry Diskin, Asst. U.S. Atty., Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Western Washington (Seattle). Before ALARCON, FERGUSON and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges. ALARCON, Circuit Judge: 1 Vincente Munoz (Munoz) and Joel Torres Salas (Salas) appeal from the order denying their motions to suppress evidence introduced at trial on the issue of guilt. Each was found guilty of possessing more than five hundred grams of cocaine with intent to distribute. The evidence was seized pursuant to two search warrants. Munoz and Salas contend that the first search warrant was invalid because it was issued on the…

Vincente Munoz (Munoz) and Joel Torres Salas (Salas) appeal from the order denying their motions to suppress evidence introduced at trial on the issue of guilt. Each was found guilty of possessing more than five hundred grams of cocaine with intent to distribute. The evidence was seized pursuant to two search warrants. Munoz and Salas contend that the first search warrant was invalid because it was issued on the basis of facts obtained as the result of unreasonable searches and seizures. Munoz challenges the validity of the second warrant on the ground that it was issued in reliance upon evidence seized during the execution of the first warrant. We conclude that each search warrant was valid and affirm.

The validity of the first search warrant depends primarily upon whether the officers were justified in conducting a pat-down search in connection with a Terry stop. A detailed recitation of the facts known to the officers prior to the pat-down is necessary to resolve this question.

I

PERTINENT FACTS

The evidence presented by the government at the hearing on the motion to suppress disclosed the following facts:

A. Citizen Informants’ Reports

Detective Christopher A. Hurst of…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I believe that the frisk of Salas exceeded the outer limits of a permissible weapons search under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Therefore, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion affirming the district court’s denial of Salas’ motion to suppress the cocaine seized from his person during that search. 1

Striking a balance between concern for the safety of law enforcement officers and the personal intrusiveness of a pat-down search, the Supreme Court in Terry recognized narrow authorization for a law enforcement officer to conduct, for his own protection and safety, a limited pat-down for weapons “where he has reason to believe he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.” Id. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. at 1883 ; see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 , 100 S.Ct. 338, 343 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 , 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1903 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). The inception and scope of a Terry frisk thus remains strictly limited to its self-protective function. As the Supreme Court has…