concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I believe that the frisk of Salas exceeded the outer limits of a permissible weapons search under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Therefore, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion affirming the district court’s denial of Salas’ motion to suppress the cocaine seized from his person during that search. 1

Striking a balance between concern for the safety of law enforcement officers and the personal intrusiveness of a pat-down search, the Supreme Court in Terry recognized narrow authorization for a law enforcement officer to conduct, for his own protection and safety, a limited pat-down for weapons “where he has reason to believe he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.” Id. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. at 1883 ; see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 , 100 S.Ct. 338, 343 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 , 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1903 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). The inception and scope of a Terry frisk thus remains strictly limited to its self-protective function. As the Supreme Court has cautioned, nothing less than a particularized belief that a person poses an immediate threat will provide the legal foundation for a pat-down of that individual for weapons:

Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93, 94 , 100 S.Ct. at 343 (emphasis added).

The majority runs afoul of this fundamental Terry principle by holding that the record in this case “amply demonstrate^]” that Officer Almy had reason to believe Salas was armed and dangerous prior to conducting the pat-down search. In reaching this conclusion, the majority misreads the record and cites several facts, including the fact that Salas was seated in an automobile when confronted by the officers, the late hour of the stop, and the possibility that Salas had recently ingested narcotics, which stated facts, in actuality, played no part in Officer Almy’s decision to search Salas. Officer Almy unequivocally testified at the suppression hearing that he had premised Salas’ weapons search solely on the fact that Salas was the subject of a “narcotics investigation.” 2

. Thus, to uphold Salas’ search in this case is to sanction a Terry weapons search based on nothing more than generalized suspicions concerning a person’s involvement in narcotics activities. Blanket generalizations about the nature of certain, crimes, however, fail to provide that specificity of information which is the hallmark of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n. 18, 88 S.Ct. at 1880 n. 18. While experience suggests that the strong likelihood of certain narcotics traffickers carrying or possessing firearms often creates safety concerns sufficient to justify a Terry weapons search, see, e.g., United States v. Pajari, 715 F.2d 1378, 1383-84 (8th Cir.1983) (detention and frisk of suspect valid when officers approached defendant with reason to believe they were confronting a “major narcotics dealer”); United States v. Post, 607 F.2d 847, 850-51 (9th Cir.1979) (not unreasonable to assume that drug suspect listed on DEA computer might be armed and dangerous); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 59 (2d Cir.1977) (reasonable to base suspicions that suspect armed and dangerous in part on his reputation as a “major narcotics dealer” in the Detroit area); United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 368-69 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 , 94 S.Ct. 1444 , 39 L.Ed.2d 490 (1974) (“[I]t would not be unreasonable to assume that a man believed to be the one of the top narcotics violators in the New York area would be carrying arms or would be otherwise violent.”), it emasculates Terry’s specificity requirement to condone weapons searches for any or all subjects of “narcotics investigations” whatever their level of suspected criminal conduct or propensity for violence. See United States v. Ceballos, 654 F.2d 177, 184 (2d Cir.1981) (generalization that narcotics traffickers frequently armed and violent, without more, insufficient to justify Terry weapons search); see also Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93 , 100 S.Ct. at 343 ; United States v. Santillanes, 848 F.2d 1103, 1108 (10th Cir.1988); United States v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 622, 629-30 (9th Cir.1988). Given the absence of any information suggesting that the officers believed they were dealing with prominent drug traffickers, or traffickers associated with other drug dealers harboring known violent tendencies, I cannot join in the majority’s inferential leap that Salas posed a credible threat of armed and dangerous behavior. 3

*541 It is not surprising that the majority’s deferential approach to justifications for Terry weapons searches finds comfort in this case involving illicit narcotics activities. Invoking the metaphors and images of battle, the government’s “war on drugs” has already made casualties of constitutional protections and personal dignity. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 1401 , 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). However laudable the underlying goal of eradicating drugs from our society, we must ensure that we do not also eradicate the Fourth Amendment in the process of serving that goal — worthy aims alone do not create reasonable searches. The Supreme Court’s admonition in Terry against affixing judicial imprimaturs on governmental conduct that invades core Fourth Amendment values bears repeating:

392 U.S. at 15, 88 S.Ct. at 1876.

Accordingly, I would reverse Salas’ conviction and remand for reevaluation of his suppression motion absent consideration of the cocaine illegally seized from his person.

. Since Munoz challenges the denial of his suppression motion based on alleged taint in the search warrant stemming from the illegal entry into Room 227 at Nendel's Motel, rather than from the parking lot search of Salas, I concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it affirms the district court’s judgment with respect to Munoz.

. During the Salas-Munoz joint suppression hearing, the following exchange took place between Officer Almy and the Assistant U.S. Attorney:

. Neither the statements made by the Nendel Motel maids, nor the officers’ first-hand observations, bore any evidence that Salas or Munoz possessed or carried weapons. Moreover, as the "narcotics investigation" of Salas and Munoz commenced at the behest of the manager of *541 Nendel’s Motel only one day prior to the arrest of Salas and Munoz, none of the officers involved in this investigation had any previous contact with, or knowledge of, their alleged narcotics activities,