United States v. Francis Floyd Ant

882 F.2d 1389 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Francis Floyd ANT, Defendant-Appellant. No. 88-3035. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Oct. 5, 1988. Filed July 27, 1989. As Amended Aug. 9, 1989. Vernon E. Woodward, Billings, Mont., for defendant-appellant. Bryon H. Dunbar, U.S. Atty., and Robert L. Zimmerman, Asst. U.S. Atty., Billings, Mont., for U.S. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana. Before TANG, THOMPSON and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges. TANG, Circuit Judge: 1 In his federal manslaughter prosecution, Francis Floyd Ant appeals the district court's refusal to suppress a guilty plea made earlier in tribal court. Both the tribal and federal cases arise out of the same alleged incident. Ant claims that the plea should be suppressed because he did not have an attorney in tribal court and because the plea was not voluntary. In denying Ant's suppression motion, the district court found that the plea was made in concordance both with tribal law and the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1302 , and ruled that suppressing the plea would violate principles of comity and disparage the tribal…

dissenting:

Because I agree with Judge Battin that suppression in federal court of the guilty plea entered in tribal proceedings disparages the integrity of tribal courts, I must respectfully dissent. The majority concedes that Ant’s plea in tribal court complied fully with tribal law and the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The majority points to no evidence of coercion, “shocking conduct,” or inaccuracy in the transcript of the tribal proceedings. Because I find no constitutional prohibition against admission of the guilty plea in federal court, and because I find no bar to admissibility as an evidentiary matter, I would affirm Judge Battin’s denial of the motion to suppress.

I agree with the majority that had the plea been entered in a state court it would have been constitutionally infirm. I agree with the majority that had the plea been made in a federal court, it would have been constitutionally infirm. I also agree that such a guilty plea, had it been made in a state trial or in another federal trial, would require suppression here for the reasons expressed in the majority opinion.

But none of these principles is relevant here. The plea occurred, not in a federal court,…

In his federal manslaughter prosecution, Francis Floyd Ant appeals the district court’s refusal to suppress a guilty plea made earlier in tribal court. Both the tribal and federal cases arise out of the same alleged incident. Ant claims that the plea should be suppressed because he did not have an attorney in tribal court and because the plea was not voluntary. In denying Ant’s suppression motion, the district court found that the plea was made in concordance both with tribal law and the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1302 , and ruled that suppressing the plea would violate principles of comity and disparage the tribal proceedings. On review, we hold that because the tribal court guilty plea was made under circumstances which would have violated the United States Constitution were it applicable to tribal proceedings, and because suppression of the plea would not violate principles of comity, would not be disparaging to the tribal court proceedings, and would not unduly prejudice the government, the judgment of the district court is reversed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Except for the facts surrounding the acceptance of Ant’s guilty plea in tribal court, the Government…