dissenting:

The majority concludes that, because the police conducted the inventory searches without first obtaining the vehicle owner’s consent, as required by Washington state law, the district court should have suppressed the evidence resulting from the searches. I dissent because the majority relies erroneously on state law rather than federal law. Moreover, it is unclear whether Washington state law requires that police give car owners the option of consenting or not consenting to an inventory search.

In United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir.1987), this court held that evidence seized by state officials in compliance with federal law is admissible in federal court without regard to state law. As the majority notes, federal law regarding an inventory search by state or local police officers requires that it be carried out in accordance with standard procedures of the local or state police department conducting the search. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 , 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3100 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1975). The majority decides, however, based only on a Washington Supreme Court case, that the State Patrol failed to follow standard state procedures because Trooper Pass neglected to request the owner’s consent prior to conducting the inventory searches. See State v. Williams, 102 Wash.2d 733, 743 , 689 P.2d 1065, 1071 (1984).

By relying on Washington state case law, the majority defines “standard procedures” to include state court rulings regarding search and seizure practices of state police. This is tantamount to incorporating implicitly by reference all of Washington state search and seizure law. The majority *1468 thereby reaches a result indirectly that Chavez-Vernaza does not allow the court to reach directly.

Here, the Washington State Trooper’s Manual sets forth the procedures officers must follow when impounding a car and conducting an inventory search. It says nothing about first requesting the consent of the vehicle’s owner. Nor was any evidence presented that officers, as part of their standard procedures, are instructed to offer the owner an opportunity to consent to an inventory search. There is no basis on which to conclude that failure to request such consent violates the standard procedures of the Washington State Patrol. 1

In order to establish that the inventory searches were conducted in accordance with standard procedures, the court must, and I would, conclude that the police impounded the vehicles properly. As noted by the majority, section 8.03.160 of the Washington State Trooper’s Manual states that the department shall conduct an inventory search of “[a]ny vehicle lawfully in the custody of the Washington State Patrol.” The manual further provides in section 3.03.140 that, if a person is arrested for driving without a valid driver’s license, the vehicle must be impounded or released to a qualified driver. Here, none of the four appellants had a valid driver’s license. Nor did any of them indicate that they had friends or relatives in the area to whom the officers could release the vehicles. The troopers impounded the vehicles properly according to standard procedures of the Washington State Patrol.

Furthermore, the majority relies exclusively on dictum in Williams to support its position. The opinion concludes that, based on Williams , Washington state law requires police to seek an owner’s consent before conducting an inventory search. The statement to that effect in Williams is dictum because that court held that the impoundment of the vehicle was unauthorized. The Washington courts have not yet squarely addressed the issue on which the majority bases its opinion.

Relying on federal law, the court should determine that there is no consent requirement. Although no federal cases have addressed the issue directly, 2 the Supreme Court has indicated its disapproval of the consent requirement. In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 376 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 3100-3102 n. 10, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1975), the majority rejected the dissent’s theory that, absent specific consent, an inventory search is permissible only in exceptional circumstances. The Court emphasized that, in addition to protection of the vehicle owner’s property and of the police from potential danger, the purpose of inventory is to: (1) protect the municipality and officers from claims of lost or stolen property; and (2) protect the public from vandals who might find a firearm or other contraband. Id. The Court rejected the consent theory as inconsistent with the purpose of inventory searches, although that precise issue was not before it. If the majority here had properly applied federal law, as required by Chavez-Vernaza , it would have to reach a different result as to suppression of the evidence.

Because the district court properly considered items 9-12 of the evidentiary facts listed in the majority opinion, I conclude that there was probable cause to conduct an investigative search. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2160 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); United States *1469 v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir.1988). I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. Appellants contend that Trooper Pass violated several other standard procedures, e.g., failing to list contraband, valuables, or any other items of property on the vehicle inventory record, neglecting to note on the vehicle report areas he did not inspect or inventory, etc. The record indicates, however, that Trooper Pass suspended his inventory search of the vehicles upon discovering evidence of contraband. There is no requirement that an officer complete an inventory search after discovering evidence sufficient to initiate an investigatory search. See United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir.1987). This contention must fail.

. Two circuits have indicated support for the consent theory, see United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 335 (D.C.Cir.1983) (dictum); United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161, 1165 (8th Cir.1980), and one circuit has rejected it, see United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883 , 894 n. 23 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (alternative holding) (per curiam), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 968 , 99 S.Ct. 458 , 58 L.Ed.2d 427 (1978).