Melvin Memphrey Carter v. Beverly Hills Savings and Loan Association Southland Company

884 F.2d 1186 14 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1008 Melvin Memphrey CARTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BEVERLY HILLS SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION; Southland Company, Defendants-Appellees. No. 86-6610. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued March 7, 1988. Submitted Aug. 3, 1988. Decided Sept. 6, 1989. As Amended Sept. 26, 1989. Melvin Memphrey Carter, Los Angeles, Cal., pro per. Gregory L. Dillion, Newmeyer, Landrum & Dillion, Newport Beach, Cal., for defendants-appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Before HUG, ALARCON and KOZINSKI, Circuit Judges. HUG, Circuit Judge: 1 This case involves an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a judgment dismissing Carter's action to set aside a foreclosure sale on his home. The district court judge, believing that the parties had entered into a settlement agreement, dismissed the underlying action with a retention of jurisdiction for sixty days to reopen if settlement was not completed. Carter made a Rule 60 motion approximately eighteen months later, which the district court denied as untimely. Because the underlying judgment was never entered in accordance with…

dissenting.

The majority finds the minute order below insufficient in three respects: (1) It failed to satisfy Rule 58’s separate document requirement; (2) it failed to satisfy Rule 58’s requirement that judgments be signed by the clerk; and (3) it was not entered in the docket in accordance with Rule 58. I disagree with all three propositions. I fear, moreover, that the majority opinion will unnecessarily complicate the docketing responsibility of the district courts, creating greater opportunity for confusion and error.

*1192 1. The Separate Document Requirement

“Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. Here, there was a separate document: It is titled “Civil Minutes — General,” it was mailed to the parties, and it is quoted in full in the majority opinion. Majority op. at 1188. If we were interpreting this part of Rule 58 for the first time, I should think our job would be done.

But this isn’t our first time; it is our third. First, in Calhoun v. United States, 647 F.2d 6 (9th Cir.1981), overruled on other grounds, Acosta v. Louisiana Dep’t of Health & Human Resources, 478 U.S. 251 , 106 S.Ct. 2876 , 92 L.Ed.2d 192 (1986) (per curiam), we…

This case involves an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a judgment dismissing Carter’s action to set aside a foreclosure sale on his home. The district court judge, believing that the parties had entered into a settlement agreement, dismissed the underlying action with a retention of jurisdiction for sixty days to reopen if settlement was not completed. Carter made a Rule 60 motion approximately eighteen months later, which the district court denied as untimely. Because the underlying judgment was never entered in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 58, we reverse.

I.

Facts

Carter brought this action in the California Superior Court against Beverly Hills Savings and Loan and Southland Company, *1188 seeking to set aside a foreclosure sale of his home which had been accomplished by Southland Company acting as trustee under a deed of trust securing a loan from Beverly Hills Savings and Loan. Carter alleged that the foreclosure sale was in violation of a bankruptcy automatic stay and a stipulation between Carter and Beverly Hills Savings and Loan in the bankruptcy action.

This case was removed to federal court on the grounds that it was an action affecting Title…