Paul G. Shultz v. Department of Army, United States of America

886 F.2d 1157 Paul G. SHULTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. No. 87-4346. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Nov. 4, 1988. Decided Sept. 28, 1989. Joseph W. Sheehan, Fairbanks, Alaska, for plaintiff-appellant. William B. Lazarus, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Lands Div., Wash., D.C., for defendant-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. Before NELSON, BOOCHEVER and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges. NELSON, Circuit Judge: 1 Paul G. Shultz appeals from the district court's dismissal of his quiet title action against the United States for lack of jurisdiction. The district court found that the action was barred by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2409a(g) (1982), which prohibits civil actions to adjudicate disputed titles to real property in which the United States claims an interest unless they are commenced within twelve years of the date on which they accrued. We reverse. An action under section 2409a accrues when the landowner or his predecessors-in-interest knew or should have known of the United States' claim. Erection of a fence, gate, and generally unattended guard post…

Paul G. Shultz appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his quiet title action against the United States for lack of jurisdiction. The district court found that the action was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) (1982), which prohibits civil actions to adjudicate disputed titles to real property in which the United States claims an interest unless they are commenced within twelve years of the date on which they accrued. We reverse. An action under section 2409a accrues when the landowner or his predecessors-in-interest knew or should have known of the United States’ claim. Erection of a fence, gate, and generally unattended guard post alone was insufficient to put a reasonable landowner on notice of a claim. We hold that the earliest the cause of action accrued was when the Army began to restrict access through a pass system, and that if, when access to the road subsequently went unrestricted, Shultz or his predecessors-in-interest had reason to believe the government did not continue to claim an interest, the cause of action accrued when the government later asserted a right to restrict access. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the…

dissenting:

I disagree with the majority’s holding that the Army’s erection of a fence, gate and guardhouse next to the roadway was insufficient to put a reasonable landowner on notice of a claim. As the district court noted the fence, guardhouse and gate manifest a government claim of right to control access to the roadway, whether exercised or not.

The majority incorrectly interprets Park County as holding that the government must manifest a claim of interest in a right of way by an actual physical interference or a complete prohibition of the public’s use to the roadway. In Park County we stated that the posted sign “put [the appellants] on notice that the United States claimed control over at least a substantial portion of the right-of-way. This claim should have put the appellants on constructive notice and alerted them to make reasonable inquiry as to the remainder of the purported right-of-way.” Park County, 626 F.2d at 721 n. 6. We held that the statute of limitations contained in the Quiet Title Act barred the county’s suit even as to the portion of the road in front of the rock barrier and sign which was not blocked or posted. Id. at 721.

As in Park County, Shultz and…