facts pled in support, his claim was not made possible by the 1992 amendment.

2 In 2008, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of “disability”

to align it with the ADA’s definition, meaning plaintiffs are no longer required to

prove an impairment was perceived to limit a major life activity. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(3); Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). However, Cooks’s claims

are based on an alleged disability arising out of his psychosis and paranoia, and

federal courts adjudicated Rehabilitation Act claims that stemmed from paranoia-

related disabilities prior to the enactment of the 2008 amendment, see, e.g.,

Fredenberg v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Health Servs., 172 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir.

1999); Johnston v. Horne, 875 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir. 1989). The facts alleged by

Cooks do not distinguish his case from pre-2008 complaints.

Because Cooks’s Rehabilitation Act claim was not made possible by either

the 1992 or 2008 amendments, the analogous state statute of limitations applies.

Sharkey v. O’Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 2015). Even assuming that

California’s longer, three-year statute applies, see id. at 770–73, Cooks’s claims are

untimely.

2. Under the Uniformed Services Act, current, former, and prospective

members of uniformed services “shall not be denied initial employment,

reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment

by an employer on the basis of that membership.” 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). Employers

are in violation of the Act if an employee’s military service is a “motivating factor”

3 for any of the aforementioned actions. Id. § 4311(c)(1). Cooks fails to state a claim

under the Act because he does not allege his military background was a motivating

factor behind the alleged discrimination. Simply put, § 4311 does not prohibit

discrimination based on a disability, which is what is alleged here. The district court

properly dismissed Cooks’s claim.

3. The final inquiry is whether Cooks should have been given another

opportunity to amend his complaint. Denial of leave to amend is “proper only when

amendment would be clearly frivolous, unduly prejudicial, cause undue delay or a

finding of bad faith is made.” United Union of Roofers v. Ins. Corp. of Am., 919

F.2d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir. 1990). Despite a previous opportunity to amend Cooks

failed to include additional facts in support of either his Rehabilitation Act or

Uniformed Services Act claims. Moreover, Cooks did not seek further amendment

in response to the County’s second motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the district court

properly dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice.

AFFIRMED.

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