Peter Cooks v. Contra Costa County

facts pled in support, his claim was not made possible by the 1992 amendment.

2 In 2008, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of “disability”

to align it with the ADA’s definition, meaning plaintiffs are no longer required to

prove an impairment was perceived to limit a major life activity. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(3); Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). However, Cooks’s claims

are based on an alleged disability arising out of his psychosis and paranoia, and

federal courts adjudicated Rehabilitation Act claims that stemmed from paranoia-

related disabilities prior to the enactment of the 2008 amendment, see, e.g.,

Fredenberg v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Health Servs., 172 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir.

1999); Johnston v. Horne, 875 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir. 1989). The facts alleged by

Cooks do not distinguish his case from pre-2008 complaints.

Because Cooks’s Rehabilitation Act claim was not made possible by either

the 1992 or 2008 amendments, the analogous state statute of limitations applies.

Sharkey v. O’Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 2015). Even assuming that

California’s longer, three-year statute applies, see id. at 770–73, Cooks’s claims…