DISCUSSION

Stolz contends the judgment should be reversed because Sergeant Chesson’s search of the safe in his garage and seizure of its contents violated the Fourth Amendment. We agree. “In California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence . . . are reviewed under federal constitutional standards.” (People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 606 (Troyer).) Under the Fourth Amendment, “a warrantless entry into a home is presumptively unreasonable.” (Troyer, at p. 606.) Prosecutors thus had “the burden of establishing that . . . [an] exception to the warrant requirement justified the entry” into Stolz’s home. (Ibid.) In reviewing the trial court’s determination that prosecutors met that burden, we defer to the court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979.) We then exercise our independent judgment to determine whether the court’s ruling on the suppression motion was correct. (Ibid.) Emergency aid exception The trial court erred when it denied Stolz’s motion to suppress the evidence found in his safe. As to the first basis prosecutors put forth to justify Sergeant Chesson’s search—the “emergency aid exception”—the parties agree that “‘police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.’ [Citation.]” (Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 606.) But “‘“‘[t]here is no ready litmus test for determining whether such circumstances exist.’”’” (Ibid.) Rather, “‘“‘in each case the claim of an extraordinary

3 situation must be measured by the facts known to the officers’”’” at the time of their search. (Ibid.) If a search is justified by the emergency aid exception, its scope is “‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies [that] justify its initiation.’” (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 393.) The officers may not, for example, continue their search once all of those who might require aid have been located. (Ibid.; see also Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 609 [search justified where officer “had no prior information indicating that only one victim was involved”].) Nor will the presence of firearms in the home, without more, justify the search. (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1043 (Ovieda).) Here, Sergeant Chesson received a report about a domestic disturbance between two people at Stolz’s residence that contained no information about the use of a weapon. As he approached the residence, Sergeant Chesson saw one person leave. Another officer saw the second person inside. Sergeant Chesson then received word that the person who had just left the residence—Stolz—had been detained. Because the sergeant’s search of the safe occurred after Stolz had been detained, after the potential victim had been located, and in the absence of evidence that firearms or other weapons posed a threat, it was not justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. (Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1043.) The Attorney General’s comparison of this case to People v. Chavez (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493 is not persuasive. In Chavez, a woman asked a police officer to go to her residence to see if the vehicle her boyfriend had taken was there. (Id. at p. 1497.) She told the officer that her boyfriend had access to a firearm and that their son may be with him. (Ibid.) When the

4 officer arrived at the residence, he saw a revolver on the ground outside and scaled a fence to retrieve it. (Ibid.) Our colleagues in the Third District upheld the seizure of the revolver because the responding officer had information that the defendant had access to a firearm and had another person with him, and he saw the gun in plain sight. (Id. at pp. 1499-1503.) In contrast, here Sergeant Chesson had no information that a firearm was involved in the domestic disturbance; he had no information that anyone other than Stolz and the unresponsive woman were involved in the disturbance; and he saw no weapon in plain sight. Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th 1034 thus controls this case, not Chavez. Protective sweep Alternatively, prosecutors argued that “an officer safety issue” justified the search of Stolz’s safe. When responding to the scene of an alleged crime, police may perform a “protective sweep,” a “quick and limited search of premises . . . to protect the safety of police officers or others.” (Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325, 327.) Such a search “is decidedly not ‘automatic,’ but may be conducted only when justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” (Id. at p. 336.) Thus, to conduct a protective sweep, police must have “a reasonable suspicion both that another person is in the premises and that that person is dangerous.” (People v. Werner (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1206 (Werner), italics original.) “The existence of such a reasonable suspicion is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by looking at the “‘“totality of the circumstances”’” to ascertain whether the police had . . . ‘a “particularized and objective basis”” for [their] suspicion.” (Ibid.)

5 Here, when Sergeant Chesson opened the safe, he knew that Stolz had been detained and that the alleged victim had been found. He thus lacked any particularized or objective basis for suspecting that any other person was at the residence or that that person was dangerous. The search of the safe was not justified as a protective sweep. (Werner, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1209 [“‘“mere abstract theoretical ‘possibility’ that someone dangerous might be inside a residence does not constitute ‘articulable facts’” justifying a protective sweep”].)1

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

PERREN, J.

1 Because we conclude that Sergeant Chesson’s search of the safe was not justified, we do not consider the parties’ remaining contentions.

6 Jesse J. Marino, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

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Sanger Swysen & Dunkle, Stephen K. Dunkle and Sarah S. Sanger for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah Hill and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.