facts, so we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo the district court’s order granting summary judgment, Momox-

Caselis v. Donohue, 987 F.3d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 2021), and its evidentiary rulings

for abuse of discretion, Clare v. Clare, 982 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2020). We

affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment to GZ on the Alexan-

ders’ claims under § 14(c) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C.

§ 1613(c)(1). The posting requirement at 43 C.F.R. § 2650.5-4(c)(1) did not require

GZ to post the boundaries of § 14(c) claims before submitting a map of boundaries

to the Bureau of Land Management. In any event, the Alexanders’ claim was barred

by the one-year statute of limitations in 43 U.S.C. § 1632(b). Even if the period

were tolled because the 2008 notice was inadequate, the limitations period has still

expired. In 2011, the Alexanders and their attorney met with the Cadastral Survey

Manager and the president of the Tanana Chiefs Conference to discuss Clarence’s

2 § 14(c) claim—thus showing that they were on actual notice that Clarence’s § 14(c)

claim did not include all the land that he thought it should. The law of the case

doctrine did not require the district court to reach a contrary result. See Askins v.

U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 899 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The law of the

case doctrine does not preclude a court from reassessing its own legal rulings in the

same case.”).

We also affirm the district court’s determination that the Alexanders’ adverse

possession claim failed as a matter of law. This conclusion did not violate the Al-

exanders’ right to a jury trial, because there were no remaining triable issues of fact.

See Sengupta v. Morrison–Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1077 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986)

(“The Constitution only requires that bona fide fact questions be submitted to a

jury.”). Assuming without deciding that the Alexanders could ever take title to the

land in question by adverse possession, the district court correctly concluded that the

Alexanders’ claim for adverse possession would fail on the hostility prong, since

Clarence affirmatively recognized GZ’s superior title to the land by filing a § 14(c)

claim. See Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 310 (Alaska 1990); Tenala,

Ltd. v. Fowler, 921 P.2d 1114, 1120 (Alaska 1996).

We do not address the Alexanders’ argument that Plat 2014-78 does not meet

the definition of a subdivision plat under Alaska law. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS,

94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised in a brief that are not supported

3 by argument are deemed abandoned.”). In any event, because the Alexanders intro-

duced Plat 2014-78 as evidence in the district court, they “cannot complain on appeal

that the evidence was erroneously admitted.” See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S.

753, 755 (2000).

Because the district court’s rulings on the merits were not erroneous, neither

was its decision to grant fees to GZ as the prevailing party.

AFFIRMED.

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