DISCUSSION

Modifying spousal or child support requires proving a material change in circumstances since the prior order. (See In re Marriage of McCann (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 978, 982 [must show increase or reduction in supporting spouse’s ability to pay for supported spouse’s needs]; In re Marriage of Leonard (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 546, 556 (Leonard) [supporting parent bears burden to show “changed circumstances warrant a downward adjustment in child support rests with the supporting spouse”].) We review support-related decisions for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1273 (Shimkus); In re Marriage of Butler & Gill (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 462, 465.) We conclude the court properly considered the uneven nature of Prem’s employment and compensation.

3 Prem argues his current cash flow, not his history as an independent contractor, should figure most prominently in the court’s analysis of his circumstances. (See In re Marriage of Mosley (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1375 (Mosley) [reversing trial court order requiring spouse to borrow money to maintain support levels, assuming he would receive discretionary year-end bonuses in the future].) However, the court was not required to focus on any one factor. (See Shimkus, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1273 [courts must consider factors listed in section 4320 when deciding request to modify spousal support]; Leonard, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 556 [courts must adhere to guidelines set forth in Family Code section 40532 when deciding request to modify child support].) The weight assigned to each factor rested within its broad discretion. (Shimkus, at p. 1273.) A spouse’s earning capacity, not just actual income, may enter the equation when gauging their ability to pay. (§§ 4053, subd. (b), 4320, subd. (c).) The court properly considered Prem’s work history over the past decade as evidence of his earning capacity. The record does not show the court denied the RFO only based on Prem’s status as an independent professional; rather, it found the expiration of his most recent short-term contract as an event both natural to his work and anticipated by the parties. It did not foreclose a later finding that a longer period of unemployment may justify modification, or, like in Mosley, that Prem’s obtaining a lower-salaried position in the future might alter the calculus as well.3 The fact that Prem

2 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Family Code.

3The parties’ lack of assets and considerable debt factored into Mosley’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order denying the supporting spouse’s request to modify. In contrast, the record

4 might have to temporarily invade his separate assets to satisfy stipulated support obligations does not render the trial court’s decision irrational or arbitrary. (See Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773 [“A ruling that constitutes an abuse of discretion has been described as one that is ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it’”].) Lastly, the provisions requiring the parties to “exercise reasonable efforts to initiate a Status Conference call with the Court prior to filing an RFO” impose a procedural condition akin to a meet and confer requirement. They do not supplant or negate either party’s burden to prove a material change in circumstances when seeking modification based on Prem’s employment status.

CONCLUSION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J. TANGEMAN, J.

shows Prem’s net separate assets exceeded $1 million at the time he sought modification. This fact alone could have justified the trial court’s denial. (See, e.g., § 4320, subd. (e) [court considers “[t]he obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party” in ordering spousal support].)

5 Timothy M. Weiner, Judge Superior Court County of Los Angeles ______________________________

Kleeman-Kremen Family Lawyers, Ruth S. Kremen, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MacKay & Martin, Lauren E. MacKay, for Defendant and Appellant.

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