Darrell Lee Brown v. Richard H. Rison, Warden

Bad Law
895 F.2d 533·1990 WL 3824·1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 731
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJanuary 23, 199088-5535California5,647 words

Opinion

Opinion

895 F.2d 533 58 USLW 2506 Darrell Lee BROWN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Richard H. RISON, Warden, et al., Respondent-Appellee. No. 88-5535. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Jan. 9, 1989. Decided Jan. 23, 1990. Charles D. Weisselberg, William J. Genego, Tracy Dressner, Law Student, PostConviction Justice Project, University of Southern California Law Center, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner-appellant. David C. Scheper, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Before WALLACE, CANBY and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges. CANBY, Circuit Judge: 1 Darrell L. Brown appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 673 F.Supp. 1505 . He contends that the federal Bureau of Prisons erroneously refused to credit his sentence for time spent in custody of a community treatment center prior to his sentencing. We reverse. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 Darrell L. Brown was arrested on charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841 & 846, on September 10, 1985. After spending…

Concurrence in Part

Wallace, J.

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in part A of the majority opinion. Because I find the Bureau of Prisons’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3568 to be reasonable, I dissent from part B and from the judgment.

The statute does not contain an explicit definition of the disputed phrase “in custody.” Using a dictionary definition, Brown’s time in the rehabilitation center might or might not be said to be “in custody.” In some respects, the conditions of his residence at the center imposed substantial restrictions on his freedom: Brown was required to be present, without outside contact, from 7 p.m. to 5 a.m.; he could not travel beyond a three-county area; he had to maintain a job and undergo regular drug testing. On the other hand, his position hardly resembled that of someone in jail: he was restricted to the center only at night, and could move freely (subject to the three-county limitation) without oversight during the day. I do not think that the clear language of the statute compels a resolution either way.

The legislative history is similarly unhelpful. The relevant phrase was inserted in the statute as part of the Bail Reform Act of 1966. The stated intent…

Lead Opinion

Canby, J.

Darrell L. Brown appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 673 F.Supp. 1505 . He contends that the federal Bureau of Prisons erroneously refused to credit his sentence for time spent in custody of a community treatment center prior to his sentencing. We reverse.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Darrell L. Brown was arrested on charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 & 846, on September 10, 1985. After spending 15 days in the county jail, Brown was released, on bond, to the custody of Eclectic Communications, Inc., a San Francisco community treatment center. As a condition of his release, the court ordered him to reside at the center, and he was required to be present at the center from 7 p.m. to 5 a.m. every day, without outside contact. In addition, he was ordered to follow all the rules and regulations of the center, including drug testing. He was also required to maintain his employment, and travel was restricted to a three county area.

Brown was sentenced on July 28, 1986, after spending 306 days at the center. The Bureau of Prisons credited his sentence with the 15 days he…

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