Puranchand D. Hemlani Radhi P. Hemlani v. Jesus S. Leon Guerrero Concepcion C. Leon Guerrero

Good Law
902 F.2d 1412·1990 WL 57674·1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 7269
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMay 8, 199088-15305California4,929 words

Opinion

Opinion

902 F.2d 1412 Puranchand D. HEMLANI; Radhi P. Hemlani, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jesus S. Leon GUERRERO; Concepcion C. Leon Guerrero, Defendants-Appellees. No. 88-15305. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Nov. 3, 1989. Decided May 8, 1990. Paul A. Lawlor, Moore, Ching, Boertzl & Lawlor, Agana, Guam, for plaintiffs-appellants. Joaquin V.E. Manibusan, Jr., Agana, Guam, for defendants-appellees. Appeal from the District Court of Guam, Appellate Division. Before SNEED, KOZINSKI and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges. DAVID R. THOMPSON, Circuit Judge: 1 The plaintiffs-appellants ("Hemlanis") sued the defendants-appellees ("Guerreros") for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property. The Guerreros, who are husband and wife, owned the property as tenants in common. Only the husband, Mr. Guerrero, signed the contract. The Superior Court of Guam ordered specific performance. The District Court of Guam, Appellate Division, 1 reversed. The Appellate Division held that because both Mr. and Mrs. Guerrero had not signed the contract it could not be specifically enforced. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. Sec. 1424-3 (c) and we affirm the…

lead Opinion

Thompson, J.

The plaintiffs-appellants (“Hemlanis”) sued the defendants-appellees (“Guerre-ros”) for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property. The Guerre-ros, who are husband and wife, owned the property as tenants in common. Only the husband, Mr. Guerrero, signed the contract. The Superior Court of Guam ordered specific performance. The District Court of Guam, Appellate Division, 1 reversed. The Appellate Division held that because both Mr. and Mrs. Guerrero had not signed the contract it could not be specifically enforced. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1424-3 (c) and we affirm the Appellate Division.

FACTS

In July 1968, Mrs. Guerrero acquired, by inheritance, a parcel of real property on Guam. The property was her separate property. In October 1968, Mrs. Guerrero conveyed a one-half interest in the property to her husband, Mr. Guerrero; since then the property has been owned by Mr. and Mrs. Guerrero as tenants in common, as to undivided one-half interests each.

In 1980, the Guam Legislature amended Guam Civil Code § 160. The 1980 amendment required both spouses to join in any conveyance, or contract to convey, community real property or real property…

dissent Opinion

Sneed, J.

dissenting:

The majority’s use of standing doctrine to preclude a time-honored equitable remedy for breach of contract to sell real property is incorrect. This is not a standing case. The issue is whether under Guam law Mr. Guerrero has any interest in the land that he can convey to the Hemlanis. If he does, the Hemlanis are entitled to the remedy of specific performance. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

The court today holds that the Hemlanis do not have standing to challenge the retroactive application of section 160 of the Civil Code of Guam, as amended in 1980, in their suit for specific performance. This puts the cart before the horse. The Hemlanis would have standing if Mr. Guerrero under Guam law has an interest that he could convey. To say he cannot obtain specific performance because he lacks standing to raise Mr. Guerrero’s claims is to import into Guam property law an alien doctrine of jurisdiction rooted in the Constitution of the United States.

Under California conveyancing law, which Guam generally follows, a buyer of real property may assert a claim for specific performance with respect to that part of the property the seller actually owns; the seller cannot…

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