Michael R. Goland v. United States of America, and Federal Election Commission, Intervenor-Appellee

903 F.2d 1247 Michael R. GOLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee, and Federal Election Commission, Intervenor-Appellee. No. 89-55422. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Dec. 12, 1989. Decided May 21, 1990. Seth P. Waxman, Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellant. George B. Newhouse, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee. Janice P. Lacy, Federal Election Com'n, Washington, D.C., for intervenor-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Before CHOY, TANG and FLETCHER, Circuit Judges. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 1 This case requires the court to apply the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA or the Act) to a peculiar political imbroglio. Appellant Michael Goland was indicted for FECA violations stemming from his activities during the 1986 United States Senate election in California. In response he filed a civil suit challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Act as applied to his alleged participation. Goland invoked a statutory provision unique to FECA that permits any individual…

dissenting:

I agree in the main with the opinion’s analysis. I write separately, however, to highlight the needlessly burdensome consequences of 2 U.S.C. § 437h mandating initial en banc hearing of constitutional challenges to FECA. In order to avoid those needlessly burdensome consequences, we split too fine a hair in this case. On the one hand, the court holds Goland’s constitutional challenge is too “frivolous” for en banc rehearing under § 437h, but on the other, it is not “frivolous” enough to warrant sanctions. This subtle distinction permits us to decide Goland’s constitutional challenge on the merits without conceding that the challenge indeed presents some, albeit unavailing, meritorious arguments.

If Goland’s constitutional challenge raises any meritorious arguments, then, as Congress has required under § 437h, we should reverse dismissal and certify the challenge to the en banc court. We avoid that needlessly wasteful process in Go-land’s case, but not without some cost. In this decision the court has added another step to FECA jurisdictional analysis with its subtle distinctions in what is frivolous. It is a step unfortunately prone to result-oriented decision making.

This case requires the court to apply the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA or the Act) to a peculiar political imbroglio. Appellant Michael Goland was indicted for FECA violations stemming from his activities during the 1986 United States Senate election in California. In response he filed a civil suit challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Act as applied to his alleged participation. Goland invoked a statutory provision unique to FECA that permits any individual eligible to vote for President to initiate an action to construe the constitutionality of the Act. That provision also directs the district court immediately to certify all questions of constitutionality to the courts of appeals, sitting en banc. The district court found the constitutional challenge frivolous, dismissed the complaint, and refused to eertify the constitutional claim to the en banc court. Goland appeals. We affirm.

FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT

In the aftermath of Watergate, Congress overhauled the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 1 The 1974 amendments set various limits on the size of individuals’ contributions to federal candidates, of expenditures by the candidates…