dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. In my view, we are required to affirm the judgment of the district court because D’Emanuele failed to make a motion for more specific findings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b). Rule 52(b) provides that “[u]pon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend its judgment accordingly.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b) (emphasis added). By its terms, rule 52(b) suggests that an appealing party such as D’Emanuele who complains about the lack'of specificity in the district court’s findings must move the district court to make more specific findings.

This case presents a paradigmatic example of the circumstances to which rule 52(b) was designed to apply. Rather than go to trial, D’Emanuele and Montgomery Ward settled the bulk of their dispute out of court. The only matter not covered by the settlement agreement was the amount of *1390 attorney’s fees D’Emanuele would receive, and, therefore, this was the only issue left to be resolved by the district court.

D’Emanuele filed an application for attorney’s fees and the district court rendered its decision. D’Emanuele believed the factual findings made by the district court were not specific enough, but he did not move the district court to make more specific findings pursuant to rule 52(b); rather, he appealed to this court. The majority now holds that we must remand to the district court for more specific findings. I disagree with the majority’s holding because it adds to the list of our duties the unnecessary and time-consuming task of initially reviewing a district court's attorney’s fee determination to see if it is specific enough. Under rule 52, specificity challenges should first be raised in the district court.

As the majority makes clear, a district court is bound under the relevant cases to provide a “concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the [attorney’s] fee award.” Maj. op. at 1384. Yet we should not lose sight of the fact that such an explanation will necessarily be made up of factual findings. In situations similar to the one presented in this case, we have held that a lack of specificity in the district court’s findings is not a sufficient ground for reversal if the appealing party has failed to call for more specific findings. In Reliance Finance Corp. v. Miller, 557 F.2d 674, 681 (9th Cir.1977), for example, we refused to reverse the district court due to the “lack of specificity of the [district] court’s findings.” We reasoned that since “[ajppellants did not propose additional or alternate findings nor did they apply to the district court for an amendment of its findings under Rule 52(b),” they were “ ‘not in the best of positions to complain that the findings made and conclusions stated are incomplete.’ ” Id. at 681-82 , quoting Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, 34 F.Supp. 15, 16 (W.D.Mo.1940), aff'd, 124 F.2d 952 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 822 , 62 S.Ct. 917 , 86 L.Ed. 1218 (1942); see also Kennedy v. United States, 115 F.2d 624, 625 (9th Cir.1940) (rejecting petitioner’s attempt to have evidence certified where it was “not shown that [petitioner] ever applied to the district court, much less that it applied within ten days of the entry of judgment for the amendment of its findings under Rule 52(b)”); Evans v. Suntreat Growers & Shippers, Inc., 531 F.2d 568, 570 (Temp. Emer. Ct.App.1976) (Evans ) (where “[ajppellants did not propose additional or alternate findings nor did they apply to the district court for an amendment of its findings under Rule 52(b) ... they cannot complain of lack of specificity of the findings”); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2581 (1971); cf. Andersen v. Cumming, 827 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir.1987) (“The appealing litigant must ensure that sufficient facts are developed at trial to support a challenge on appeal.”) (emphasis added).

Although rule 52(b) provides that in a bench proceeding, no motion need be made to preserve “the question of the sufficiency of the evidence,” this provision does not extend to challenges to the specificity of the district court’s findings. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 52(b). As we recognized in Reliance Finance, although a party’s failure to make a rule 52 motion “does not prevent [that party] from attacking a finding which is erroneous,’’ the party “cannot complain of lack of specificity of the findings, when [he] propose[s] nothing to this effect. ” 557 F.2d at 682 , quoting Evans, 531 F.2d at 570 (emphasis added).

The majority criticizes my position by arguing that rule 52 does not apply to motions for attorney’s fees. Maj. op. at 1387 -1388. Rule 52(a) does indeed state that “[fjindings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b).” What the majority fails to point out, however, is that this case does not involve a “motion” for attorney’s fees pursuant to the federal rules in the same sense as a rule 12 or rule 56 motion. Rather, as the district court specifically observed on page 1 of its order, this case concerned an application for attorney’s fees pursuant to a settlement agreement. The only task of the district court was to determine a reasonable award of attorney’s fees for D’Em- *1391 anuele. In accomplishing this task, the district court was required by the case law to make findings. The text of rule 52 applies generically to “actions” of the district court in which findings are made. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b). An application for attorney’s fees, particularly where it is the only matter the court is addressing, would seem to qualify as one such “action.” Thus, I see no reason to exclude from the strictures of rule 52 findings made in the course of a district court’s determination of an attorney’s fees application made pursuant to a settlement agreement. As I point out above, the case law certainly does not require such an exclusion and, in fact, strongly suggests that a rule 52 motion be made in these circumstances. Therefore, I see no basis for the majority’s argument that, as a threshold matter, rule 52 does not apply to this case.

Applying rule 52 in this case makes profound sense as a matter of judicial policy. In the Advisory Committee Notes to rule 52, the Committee observed that it is primarily the district court’s function to make findings and that it is a waste of judicial resources for the appellate courts constantly to be reviewing the adequacy of these findings. See Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). The Committee recognized that, in the interests of “stability and judicial economy, ... the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the facts.” Id. It follows that challenges to the specificity of the district court’s factual findings should be dealt with as much as possible at the trial court level. Rule 52(b) is the device for ensuring that this will occur.

The judicial system has become overburdened with fee litigation cases. The majority’s refusal to apply rule 52 in this case does nothing to lighten that burden. Indeed, it adds to it. Requiring a rule 52 motion in this context would spare the judicial system the cumbersome and wasteful task of having to remand for more specific findings when a simple post-trial motion would bring it to the attention of the district court where corrective action can occur immediately.

We do not reach the merits in this appeal. Our decision is the functional equivalent of a rule 52 motion: it alerts the district court that its findings are insufficient. But at what price: time is wasted, scarce judicial resources are spent, and more attorney’s fees are incurred. Montgomery Ward will pay its own. I suppose D’Emanuele will eventually request attorney’s fees for this appeal — in spite of the fact that a simple rule 52 motion might have promptly, efficiently, and inexpensively solved the problem.

In my view, D’Emanuele’s failure to make a rule 52(b) motion in the district court precludes him from challenging the specificity of the district court’s findings. I would therefore affirm the district court’s decision.