United States v. 313.34 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Jefferson County, State of Washington, Etc., Jeffrey Jay Kamp Jill Jay Kamp

dissenting:

Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusions both that the phrase “structures, suitable for use as a personal residence” is ambiguous and that the Secretary’s interpretation thereof as requiring a building permit was reasonable, I respectfully dissent.

The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the statutory language itself. Unless otherwise defined, the words selected by Congress should be given their ordinary, common meaning. Foxgord v. Hischemoeller, 820 F.2d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 , 108 S.Ct. 503 , 98 L.Ed.2d 502 (1987). “In construing a federal statute it is appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of the language that Congress employed accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 , 105 S.Ct. 638, 645 , 83 L.Ed.2d 556 (1985) (quotation & footnote omitted). Where “the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 , 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030 , 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 , 37 S.Ct. 192, 194 ,…

Following final judgment in the government’s condemnation action, Jeffrey and Jill Kamp (the “Kamps”) appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for life use of their property pursuant to the Protection Island National Wildlife Refuge Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-333, §§ 2-8, 96 Stat. 1623 (the “Act”). The district court held none of the structures on the Kamps’ property on Protection Island is “suitable for use as a personal residence” within the meaning of the Act. The court based this determination on the fact that no building permit was issued for any of the structures, a circumstance which the Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) asserted was necessary to a residence being “suitable” under the Act. The district court concluded that the Act did not require the Fish and Wildlife Service to offer the Kamps a life use, or a shorter extended period of use, of their property. We affirm.

FACTS

Protection Island is a 400-acre island located at the entrance of Puget Sound in Jefferson County, Washington. The Island “provides nesting habitat for 72 per cen-tum of the entire seabird population of Puget Sound and the Strait of Juan de Fuca” and “also provides refuge for…

923 F.2d 698 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 313.34 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATED IN JEFFERSON COUNTY, STATE OF WASHINGTON, etc., et al., Defendant, Jeffrey Jay Kamp; Jill Jay Kamp, Defendants-Appellants. No. 89-35529. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted June 8, 1990. Decided Jan. 15, 1991. Duncan C. Wilson, Sampson Wilson & Combs, Renton, Wash., for defendants-appellants. George W. Van Cleve and Angus E. Crane, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Before HALL, THOMPSON and LEAVY, Circuit Judges. DAVID R. THOMPSON, Circuit Judge: 1 Following final judgment in the government's condemnation action, Jeffrey and Jill Kamp (the "Kamps") appeal the district court's denial of their motion for life use of their property pursuant to the Protection Island National Wildlife Refuge Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-333, Secs. 2-8 , 96 Stat. 1623 (the "Act"). The district court held none of the structures on the Kamps' property on Protection Island is "suitable for use as a personal residence" within the meaning of the Act. The…