dissenting:

Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusions both that the phrase “structures, suitable for use as a personal residence” is ambiguous and that the Secretary’s interpretation thereof as requiring a building permit was reasonable, I respectfully dissent.

The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the statutory language itself. Unless otherwise defined, the words selected by Congress should be given their ordinary, common meaning. Foxgord v. Hischemoeller, 820 F.2d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 , 108 S.Ct. 503 , 98 L.Ed.2d 502 (1987). “In construing a federal statute it is appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of the language that Congress employed accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 , 105 S.Ct. 638, 645 , 83 L.Ed.2d 556 (1985) (quotation & footnote omitted). Where “the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 , 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030 , 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 , 37 S.Ct. 192, 194 , 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917)).

The dictionary is the place to determine the ordinary and plain meaning of the statutory terms “structure, suitable for use as a personal residence.” See Foxgord, 820 F.2d at 1032 . “Structure” is commonly defined as “[tjhat which is built or constructed; an edifice or building of any kind.” 1 ' Black’s Law Dictionary 1276 (5th ed. 1979). “Suitable” is defined as “[f]it and appropriate for the end in view.” Id. at 1286. “Residence” is defined generally as a place of dwelling or habitation. See, e.g., Webster’s New World Dictionary 1209 (2d ed. 1984). By combining the definition of the above terms, the statutory phrase “structure, suitable for use as a personal residence” plainly means any building which is fit to dwell in. This plain meaning does not suggest or imply a permit requirement.

The plain meaning of legislation is conclusive “except in the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.” Ron Pair Enters., 109 S.Ct. at 1031 (quotation omitted). See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. P.I.E., Inc., 853 F.2d 721 , 725 (9th Cir.1988) (plain meaning conclusive unless “a literal reading of the statute would thwart the underlying purposes of the statutory scheme or lead to an absurd result”). That is not the case here.

Congress expressly ordered the Secretary to offer to acquire certain land subject to extended and life use reservations “in order to lessen the impact of Federal [acquisition] on the present owners.” Protec *704 tion Island National Wildlife Refuge Act, Pub.L. No. 97-333, § 4 (b)(1), 96 Stat. 1623 (1982) (the “Act”). Congress clearly felt that “subject to such terms and conditions as the Secretary deems necessary,” id., such use would be compatible with the purposes for which the refuge was established. There is no indication from the express terms of the Act that granting life uses to persons who own structures which are fit for habitation, but for which no building permits were issued, contravenes the intent of Congress in drafting the Act. A structure need not be constructed pursuant to an approved building permit to be fit to dwell in. Congress could easily have included a permit requirement in the Act itself if that had been its true intent in permitting life uses. It did not do so.

This conclusion is amply supported by the legislative history. See Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc) (court may look to the legislative history to see if the plain and unambiguous statutory language is contrary to the clearly expressed legislative intention). The “life use” provision was added to the Act by its author, the House of Representatives, “to insure that those owners who have homes on the Island be allowed to use them for the remainder of their lives.” H.R. No. 403, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981). The House believed that such level of use would be “compatible with preserving the bird life on the Island.” Id. The Senate thereafter approved the life-use provision without any amendments.

The legislative history also supports the plain meaning of the statutory language and the conclusion that it was not Congress’ intent to include a permit requirement. The House Committee Report provides:

Id. (emphasis added). There is no evidence to suggest that a structure “located” on property, such as a trailer, must be “constructed” pursuant to an approved building permit.

As the majority opinion notes, there is some legislative history developed in the Senate which suggests that a permit requirement was contemplated. See Senate Report No. 426, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1982). However, where, as here, “possible conflicting inferences” can be drawn, “the language of the statute generally prevails over the legislative history.” In re Stringer, 847 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir.1988). See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. United States EPA, 759 F.2d 922 , 929 (D.C.Cir.1985) (statutory language controls where it conflicts with one portion of the legislative history). The statutory language does not suggest or imply a permit requirement in order for the life-use provision to apply. Moreover, it is “plainly wrong ... to regard committee reports as drafted more meticulously and as reflecting the congressional will more accurately than the statutory text itself. Committee reports ... do not embody the law. Congress ... votes on the statutory words, not on different expressions packaged in committee reports.” Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 , 1054 n. 11 (D.C.1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1 , 108 S.Ct. 252 , 98 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). 2 Therefore, the clear statutory language controls.

*705 The restrictive interpretation adopted by the Service and the majority opinion is inconsistent with the express statutory mandate. Congress broadly ordered the Secretary to offer to acquire the land subject to a life use where the land contained a structure fit to dwell in. If Congress as a whole had meant to exclude trailers or limit life uses only to structures built in accordance with a building permit, it could easily have done so by inserting language to that effect in the Act itself. It chose not to. Accordingly, I would remand the case for a determination whether, despite the lack of building permits, the Kamp structures are “suitable for use as personal residence[s]” within the meaning of the Act.

. A Washington appellate court has included "[a] trailer placed on land for use as a dwelling” within the definition of "structure.” See Anderson v. State, Dep’t of Ecology, 34 Wash.App. 744 , 664 P.2d 1278, 1281 (1983) (quotation omitted).

. The Senate Report's permit requirement also contradicts other portions of the Act. Congress knew prior to passing the Act that Jefferson County had imposed a building moratorium on *705 Protection Island in 1974. No new residential building permits were issued after 1974. Nevertheless, Congress selected January 1, 1982, as the date for determining eligibility for life uses — the landowner was entitled to a life use if the "structure ... was located on the land on January 1, 1982.” Thus, to imply a permit requirement would require the date for determining eligibility to be rolled back to 1974. Such an interpretation contradicts and usurps the clear statutory language of section 4(b)(1)(A).