United States v. Francisco Nolasco

This en banc appeal calls for reconsideration of our rule establishing the circumstances under which it is reversible error for a district court to refuse to define “reasonable doubt” to the jury.

I. BACKGROUND

Francisco Nolasco, an illegal alien, was convicted on 19 counts of harboring illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(1)(C). Nolasco appealed the district court’s refusal to define the term “reasonable doubt” to the jury. In United States v. Witt, 648 F.2d 608 (9th Cir.1981), we held that the decision whether to give a supplemental instruction defining “reasonable doubt” was within the sound discretion of the district court. We subsequently qualified that discretion in United States v. Wosepka, 757 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), modified, 787 F.2d 1294 (1985), where we held that a trial judge committed reversible error by incorrectly defining reasonable doubt in a case involving complicated issues. The panel that initially considered the appeal in this case interpreted Wosepka to require a reasonable doubt definition in *871 every case of “any complexity. United States v. Nolasco, 881 F.2d 678, 679 (9th Cir.1989). Finding this case to be relatively simple and…

with whom PREGERSON, ALARCON, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:

The majority acknowledges the indispensability in our criminal justice system of the government’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That high standard of proof is required by the due process clause of the Constitution for reasons articulated by the Supreme Court in In re Winship:

397 U.S. 358, 363 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The Court further emphasized that the standard must play an important instructive role for the jury.

Id. at 364 , 90 S.Ct. at 1072 .

Nevertheless, the majority declines to require trial judges to give any explanation of the reasonable doubt standard to the jury other than stating the bare words “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Because I believe the majority’s approach is inadequate, I respectfully dissent.

The phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” conveys an important legal concept. It is not a common phrase used by lay people and does not have a self-evident meaning. True, each word in the phrase occurs regularly in common speech. However, placed together without further explanation, the words do not necessarily convey the high standard of proof…

926 F.2d 869 59 USLW 2574 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Francisco NOLASCO, Defendant-Appellant. No. 88-1156. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued En Banc and Submitted July 24, 1990. Decided Feb. 15, 1991. David M. Ochoa, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant-appellant. Linda A. Akers, U.S. Atty., and Gary A. Husk, Asst. U.S. Atty., Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. Before GOODWIN, WALLACE, FLETCHER, FARRIS, PREGERSON, ALARCON, POOLE, WIGGINS, NOONAN, LEAVY and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges. FARRIS, Circuit Judge: 1 This en banc appeal calls for reconsideration of our rule establishing the circumstances under which it is reversible error for a district court to refuse to define "reasonable doubt" to the jury. I. BACKGROUND 2 Francisco Nolasco, an illegal alien, was convicted on 19 counts of harboring illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1324 (a)(1)(C). Nolasco appealed the district court's refusal to define the term "reasonable doubt" to the jury. In United States v. Witt, 648 F.2d 608 (9th Cir.1981), we held that the decision whether to give a supplemental instruction…