Hays

delivered the following concurring opinion:

I concur in the conclusion to which my associate, Mr. Justice Wells, has come; but my opinion is based upon the grounds—

1st. That the Act of April 29th, 1851, is prospective in its operation, and to give it a retrospect beyond the time of its passage, would be in violation of all settled rules of construction, destroying the uniformity of the statute, and, in many instances, impairing and unsettling the rights of litigants.

2d. That there was no legal redemption (as it appears from the finding of the Court below), made by any authorized person.

I had intended to have written a separate opinion, stating my views in extenso, but other business of the Court, as well as my want of health, have prevented. I shall therefore content myself with thus briefly stating the points of my concurrence, and shall reserve the liberty of filing an opinion at some subsequent time.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case has attracted more attention, and excited deeper interest than any other ever presented to us; and we have departed from the general rule by hearing four counsel on each side. The questions presented are numerous and complicated.

In view of the importance of the decision as affecting other transactions, as well as establishing precedents to govern us hereafter, we have examined minutely the points raised by counsel.

Primarily, two propositions are advanced. The first is: That the Bedemption Act, as it is called, does not apply to this cáse, for the reason that by the rule of construing stat *132 utes, it was intended by the law-making power that it should have a prospective, and not a retrospective effect; and for the further reason, that if it was designed to have a retrospective action, then the law is in contravention of that clause of the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits the several States from passing laws impairing the obligations of contracts,

Let us consider the first. Shall the Court, in construing-the 229th section of the Practice Act, authorizing the redemption of real estate, give to the statute a…

delivered the following 'dissenting opinion:

As this case is presented on the record, it is in effect a Bill in Chancery to enforce the specific performance of a contract for a sale of lands made by the Sheriff on execution.

It is true that it is brought in the name of The People upon the relation of the purchasers, and purports to [155] be an *application for the prerogative writ of mandamus, to compel the Sheriff to do a duty which it is alleged is enjoined on him by law. But it does not stop at this; it goes into a consideration of the time of the original contracts, and the rights of the parties under them, and propounds an investigation .into the title, of the City of San *156 Francisco, the defendant in execution, into tlie title of the Commissioners of the Funded Debt, as successors by conveyance of the city, and into the legality of the acts of various parties, who united to effect a redemption of the property sold.

It must therefore be considered a proceeding of that character, which its nature and subject matter combine to give it.

The main reliance of the complainants in this case is, that the Act of 1851, which provides for a redemption of real property sold under…