Field, J. concurring.

The main question in this case is, can a chose in action, like that in evidence, be sold by the Sheriff under execution, by *20 virtue of a general levy, so that the title of it passes to the vendee. Plaintiff had judgment and execution against Bien for some seven hundred and fifty dollars, and issued execution thereon, which the Sheriff returns, levied as follows :

*21 The agreement claimed to have been made is in these words:

There were some two or three persons at the sale, and the agreement was struck off for one hundred dollars to plaintiff. The agreement was not present at the sale, nor fully explained to the bystanders. The plaintiff was a stockholder of the Bear River Company, against which company a suit was pending by Bien at the time of the sale, and the question of liability of the company on this agreement was in controversy.

*22 The contract was not read to the few persons present at the Sheriff’s sale, nor was any more particular description made than that given in the levy. Section 124 of the Practice Act provides that all debts due the defendant and all other property may be attached. Section 217—debts and credits and other property not capable of manual delivery, may be levied upon by execution. Section 220, directs the Sheriff to collect or sell the things in action. Section 227—the purchaser of personal property capable of manual delivery, shall receive the possession, and also a certificate of sale if he desires it. Section 228, provides that the Sheriff shall execute and deliver to the purchaser of personal property not subject to manual delivery a certificate of sale and payment.

It is contended by the Appellant that choses in action are subject to levy and sale as other property, and certainly some countenance seems to be given to this idea as well by the provisions of the statute as the cases of Adams & Co. v. Hackett & Co. ( 7 Cal. 187 ,) and Johnson v. Reynolds. Ho statute could be more impolitic or more unnecessary, if this be its true interpretation ; for the exercise of the right must necessarily lead to the most enormous sacrifices and the grossest frauds; and effectual modes are already provided by which these rights of property can be reached by the creditor, and for their full value, as well as by a levy and sale of them. It is contended that this levy may be made, not upon the chose in action, that is, upon the written contract note, etc. but upon the debt—that is, upon a mere guess of indebtedness, and that this levy at once changes the property from the debtor to the Sheriff, and, by the sale, from the Sheriff to the purchaser. Of course, the Sheriff sells in every such case, neither knowing himself, nor could the purchaser know, where the note was—whether assigned or not—whether there were any defenses or not—or, probably, where the title of the note was, or what its value. The purchase would, in such instances, be a mere gambling speculation, in which one man would probably be ruined if the chose was for a large amount, for the benefit of some speculator having secret information as to the facts. It is contended, further, that this applies not only to liquidated claims, but to unliquidated—to every sort of chose in action—we presume to executory contracts—to contingent contracts—to ev *23 eiy sort of contract whereby one man is or may become indebted to another; that a covenant of warranty may be thus sold and assigned, bonds of indemnity, open accounts, partnership balances, and in fine, every sort of remote or contingent interest, in suit, or however complicated. According to this theory, a chancery suit may be sold out, or, perhaps, even a claim for damages in slander or assault and battery. Before we give our sanction to so sweeping and destructive a construction of the statute, we must be very thoroughly convinced the terms of it require this interpretation. The common law recognized no such notions, and this statute, so far derogating from it, is to receive a strict construction.

If we concede that a chose in action is the subject of levy, are we authorized to hold that the chose itself need not bo levied on ? To decide that there may be a mere ideal levy ? There need be nothing tangible and physical, or a reduction to actual possession and dominion of the thing itself which is the subject of the levy ? If this wore so as to notes, judgments, etc. can we hold that contingent and complicated contracts are embraced by the act, and not only a chose in action, calling for a definite sum without any condition ?

But, not passing on these points, we hold when the paper evidencing the debt is not present to be assigned to the purchaser, and exhibited to the bystanders, that at the very least, a full and accurate description of the particular interest and chose in action, with all of its conditions and covenants, and a full explanation of the facts which determine the value of such instrument or contract, must be given by the levy arid announced at the sale. If a Sheriff could sell a piece of property—as a horse running loose in the woods—we suppose no one would doubt that he must so describe it as to give some idea of its character, qualities, and value; and the reason is not less for requiring such a description in a case like this—the whole value and motive to purchase depending upon this description and these facts—and, certainly, if a bill were filed to enforce such a purchase as the one just supposed, the defendant might set up, if a horse worth a thousand dollars were sold by the Sheriff, in the presence of three persons, for a dollar—that the sale should not be enforced. It is of the essence of every public sale that there be a descrip *24 tion sufficient to apprise the bystanders, with reasonable accuracy, of what is sold or offered. It will be seen by reference to the levy and agreement before fully set out, that the Sheriff did not pursue this course; and, therefore, no title whatever passed by this sale.

Judgment affirmed.