A decree of the Probate Court, admitting a will to probate, not reversed by the appellate Court, is final and conclusive, and is not liable to be vacated or questioned by any other Court, either incidentally or by a direct proceeding for the purpose of impeaching it.

A will having been once admitted to probate, must, so long as the probate stands, be recognized and admitted in all courts to be valid.

In England, it is well settled by a Ipng series of decisions, that the comprehensive jurisdiction exercised by Courts of Chancery in setting aside instruments obtained by fraud does not extend to wills, and that those Courts have no power to determine the validity of a will of either personal or real property.

Courts of Chancery in England, in their eflbrts to defeat fraudulent practices, have, in some cases, deprived parties of the benefit of the fraudulent will, decreeing that such parties should hold the property under their will in for the parties who would have been entitled to it if such will had not been'/ probated, but in all such cases they have disclaimed any power to set asid® the will or the probate.

In the United States, the Courts have uniformly held that the principles established in England apply and govern the cases arising under the probate laws of country, and that whenever, in any State, the power to probate a will is given to a Probate or Surrogate’s Court, the decree of such Court cannot bo set-aside or vacated by the Court of Chancery on the ground that it was obtained! by fraud, or on any other ground. I

The probating of a will is not a proceeding to decide a contest between parties, but a proceeding in rem, to determine the character and validity of an instrument affecting the title to property, and which it is necessary for the repose of society should be definitely settled by one judgment; and therefore the decree of probate is conclusive, not only upon the parties who may be before the Court, but upon all other persons and upon all Courts.

The danger which might ibe apprehended from holding as conclusive, upon so important a matter as the probate of a will, the decree of a single Court, and that not of the highest jurisdiction, is guarded against by the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, and by the statutory provision allowing the decision to be opened and the validity of the will to be again contested in the same Court by any one interested, within one year from the admission to probate.

Whether the exception in regard to probate decrees be founded in good reason or otherwise, it has become too firmly established to be disregarded; and at the present day it would not be a greater assumption to deny the general rule that Courts of Chancery may set aside judgments procured by fraud, than to deny the exception to that rule in the case of probate decrees.

In a proceeding commenced by the State in a District Court, for the purpose of setting aside a decree of the Probate Court establishing the validity of a will, it is not important to decide whether the period of one year fixed as the time within which persons interested may appear and contest the probate is a limitation which runs against the State; as the only effect of holding that it does not, would be to authorize the State to institute such proceeding in the Probate Court, but not to confer any new jurisdiction upon the District Court.

An injunction for the purpose of protecting property during litigation will not be allowed, where the complaint shows that the party seeking the injunction has no title to, or interest in, the property, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought by the litigation.

A law relating to the subject matter of an order made by the lower Court previous to its passage, will not affect the decision of the Supreme Court on an appeal from the order. The decision in the appellate Court must be whether the order was correct or erroneous at the time it was made.

An information having been filed on behalf of the State in the District Court, asking a decree that an estate of a certain deceased person had escheated to the State, an action was subsequently commenced in the same Court, and in the same behalf, in aid of the information, for the purpose of obtaining, with other relief, an injunction to prevent the dissipation of the property of the estate pending the litigation under the information. The complaint in the latter action showed affirmatively that an instrument purporting to have been the will of the deceased, but alleged in the complaint to have been a forgery, by which the property was devised to a person capable of taking and holding it, had been in due form admitted to probate and established as the will of the deceased by a decree of the Probate Court, which was still in force: Held, on appeal from an order of the District Court granting the injunction, that the complaint was devoid of equity, and showed that the plaintiff was not entitled to the ultimate relief sought in either of the proceedings, and that as a consequence, there was no right to an injunction and that the order must be reversed.

The law upon a question does not become settled by the mere opinion of Judges unnecessarily expressed, but only by a decision of the point when being the ground, or at least one of the grounds, of a judgment.

When a case is sent back for new trial, it may be appropriate, though not strictly necessary for the decision of the question of a new trial, to give an opinion upon points that will arise in the Court below, and must be decided, to finally terminate the case; but an opinion will not, at the request of counsel, be expressed upon points not necessary to be decided, and an opinion upon which can have no effect upon the case in any stage of it.