A complaint which avers substantially that the defendant was at a certain time indebted to the plaintiff in a certain sum for professional services rendered at the special instance and request of the defendant, is sufficient without stating in terms the value of the services or that the defendant promised to pay.

The promise to pay alleged in the common count in assumpsit, was a mere conclusion of law from the facts stated, and need not be averred under the new code, which requires only the facts to be stated.

In an action by the assignee of an account, unliquidated demand, or thing in action, not arising out of express contract, the assignor cannot be made competent as a witness for the plaintiff by giving the notice of intention to testify, provided for in Sec. 422 of the Practice Act as recently amended. The clause in the latter section which speaks of an assignor of a thing in action or contract, includes only such persons as were permitted to testify under the provisions of Sec. 4, and not those prohibited by it. The amendments to Sec. 422 do not in any way extend the right of examining an assignor.

A party to an action is not bound by, or held to admit as true, statements made by his witnesses during the trial of a cause, because he does not deny or contar diet them at the time.

In order to affect a person by conversations or declarations made in his presence they must be made to him in such a manner as requires him to deny or, by his acquiescence, to admit them.

In an action by S. against a stage company to recover damages for injuries sustained by the upsetting of a coach, the physician of S. was called by him as a witness to prove the value of his professional services as an element of damages. In a subsequent action brought by the physician against S., to recover for his services, the plaintiff offered proof of what he himself had testified as to their value upon the former trial, in connection with the fact that plaintiff was present and heard the evidence and made no objection to its correctness : held, that the evidence was inadmissible; that S. was not estopped from denying the truth of the evidence by having used it upon the former trial, for the reason that plaintiff had not been thereby influenced to do any act to his injury, and that S. was not bound by it, as an admission, for the reason that under the circumstances he was not called upon to admit or deny its truth.

Admissions of fact by counsel in one action, whether made during the hearing of the evidence or upon the argument, are not admissible in evidence against the client in another action.

The doctrine of acquiescence does not apply to proceedings on trials of controversies, because it is not the right or duty of a party to interrupt the order of proceedings in such cases by denials or contradictions, and his silence cannot, therefore, under such circumstances, be deemed an admission.