The finding of a jury upon a fact which they are so peculiarly fitted to decide as the genuineness of a signature to a conveyance, will rarely if ever be interfered with on the ground that such finding is not warranted by the evidence.

A witness will not be presumed to be interested because he is shown to have executed a deed to the party calling him of the land in controversy, where the deed itself is not produced, and no proof is made as to the covenants which it contained. The Court will not presume that the deed contained covenants of warranty.

A grantor to whom his grantee still owes a portion of the purchase money may remove his interest in the controversy between the latter and a third person as to the title by executing to the grantee a formal release of all claims for the balance due.

The decision in Peabody v. Phelps (9 Cal. 213_), to the effect that an action for a false and fraudulent representation as to the naked fact of title in the vendor of real estate, cannot be maintained by the purchaser who has taken possession of the premises sold under a conveyance with express covenants; and that if a party takes a conveyance without covenants, he has no remedy in case of failure of title—commented on and its correctness when applied to cases of fraud questioned.

Under Sec. 422 of the Practice Act as amended in 1861, the vendee of the defendant and vendor of the plaintiff is, without regard to his interest, admissible as a witness for the plaintiff upon an issue as to the genuineness of the defendant’s deed, where the latter has been examined upon that question on his own behalf.

Where plaintiff claimed title through a deed purporting to have been made by the defendant to H. & IT., the genuineness of which was denied by the answer : held, that a declaration of defendant that he had made a deed of the land to P., in connection with proof that P. had received no deed, and had negotiated respecting the purchase with N. & H., was admissible evidence for plaintiff as a circumstance tending to show that the defendant had actually made the deed to N. & H., and was probably mistaken as to the grantee.

Held, further, that declarations made by defendant to H. a few days before the date of the deed, were admissible on the same grounds.

Upon the trial of an issue as to the genuineness of a deed, the Court gave the following instructions to the jury : “ If there is a reasonable theory consistent with the evidence by which the jury can find in favor of the genuineness of the deed, and consistent with the honesty and truthfulness of all the witnesses in the case, it is the duty of the jury to adopt that theory in preference to one by which perjury or forgery may be involved on the part of a portion of the witnesses held, that there was no error in giving this instruction.

Where, upon the trial, the genuineness of a signature is put in issue and made the subject of proof, a new trial will not be granted on account of the discovery of new evidence tending to prove the signature a forgery.