Appeal from tbe District Court of Thirteenth District, Merced County.

This action was tried by tbe Court and judgment entered in favor of defendants. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, which was denied; from tbe judgment and order denying tbe motion for a new trial this appeal is taken.

Tbe other facts are stated in tbe opinion.

First — It was tbe intention of tbe Legislature, in ordering a survey to be made, to make tbe survey determine tbe boundary between tbe initial points, where no natural boundary is given; and, until tbe survey is made wbicbis to fix tbe line, tbe jurisdiction on tbe line to be surveyed remains as left by tbe Act of March 8, 1866,

Second — Tbe survey was not made until long after tbe time wben tbe lien for taxes bad accrued to Merced. If Stanislaus acquired tbe territory after tbe lien accrued sbe did not thereby acquire any right to tbe taxes of that year. (Moss v Shear, 25 Cal. 38.)

Third — Taking tbe language of tbe statute, it is apparent that tbe Legislature did not intend to be understood as respondents contend.

“Beginning at tbe Stakes monument, thence in a straight line to a point on tbe San Joaquin Biver seven-miles below tbe mouth of tbe Merced Biver.”

This is tbe first call in tbe boundary mentioning tbe river. Tbe line commences straight, and runs to a point in tbe river, and as if to show that it was not tbe intention of tbe Legislature to make this seven miles by tbe meanders of tbe river, they make tbe river by its meanders tbe line from that point up to tbe mouth of tbe Merced.

First — In taking tbe distance from one point to another on a navigable river, tbe measurement should be by its meanders and not in a direct line. (Johnson v. Panned's Heirs, 2 Wheaton, 206; 4 Peter’s Condensed Bep. 84; 4 Curtis’ Bep. 79.)

So also where tbe distance called for is upon a road. (Bodleyv. laylor, 5 Cranch. 191; Hitev. Graham, 2 Bibb. 144-5 ; McKee v. Bodley, Id. 482 ; Whittaker v. Hall, Id. 79 ; Craig v. Hawkins Id. 53.)

This rule was recognized in Kimball v. Tenwle. (25 Cal. 449.)

“It is well settled by numerous authorities that where a river is named as a boundary, tbe boundary line follows tbe meanders of tbe stream.” (Hieles v. Coleman, 25 Cal. 142; Gh'eejileaf v. Kilton, 11 N. H. 531; Luce v. Garley, 24 "Wendell, 451; Morrison v. Keen, 3 Greenleaf, 474; Devaston v. Payne, 2 Smith’s Lead. Cases,, and 243-4, and cases therein cited.)

Second — The taxes levied on the land described in the complaint in this action, for the fiscal year A. X). 1868, by the Board of Supervisors of Merced County, prior to the passage of the Act of the Legislature defining the boundary line between the counties of Stanislaus and Merced, approved February 13th, 1868, (Stats. 1867-8, p. 56.) did not become a lien upon said land in the county of Merced, at the time the taxes were levied thereon, and the taxes so levied on said land in Merced County never attached as a lien thereon, and were not payable in said county.

The Board of Supervisors in each county in this State were authorized and required by law to levy the taxes for the fiscal year A. D. 1868, at any time between the 28th day of February and the first Monday of April in said year, and the act of the Board of Supervisors in levying the taxes in Merced County for the fiscal year 1868, prior to that time, was an absolute nullity. (See Statutes 1867-8, p. 82.) The land described in the complaint was, on and after the 13th day of February, A. D. 1868, situated in the county of Stanislaus, and the taxes for said fiscal year thereon duly levied by the Board of Supervisors of Stanislaus County prior to the first Monday of April, A. D. 1868. When such taxes became a lien upon said land, which could not be satisfied or removed until all the taxes thereon assessed were paid, or the land vested absolutely in a purchaser under a sale for taxes. (Stats. 1867-8, pp. 56, 82-3: Moss v. Shear, supra; Ex parte Corbett, unreported case July Term, 1867.)