Appeal from tbe District Court of tbe Fifteenth District, City and County of San Francisco. ,

The plaintiff appealed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

We find in this covenant the mention at least of two separate and distinct limits wherein restraint is to be exercised. Tbe breach of covenant is alleged to have accrued within the limits of the first mentioned area, and the complaint in this regard is silent as to the other. If the memorandum of contract had contained a covenant of restriction limited only to the City and County of San Francisco, such a covenant would undoubtedly have been valid. ( Wright v. Byder, 36 Cal. 357-8; Chappell v. Broclmay, 21 Wend. 162; Eol-lyroolc v. Waters, 9 How. Fr. 338; Bunn v. Gay, 4 East.' 190.) But it is insisted, that because the memorandum, of contract contains the further words “or State of California,” the effect is to destroy the force of the covenant as regards the area limited to the City and County of San Francisco, or the contract is to be so construed as to merge this reasonable and restricted limit to the said City and County, into a general and total limit extending over the whole State. In other words, that, by this addition to tbe contract, tbe intention of tbe parties was /to wipe away any effect created by their former words, and to create bnt a single covenant of restraint, limited to 'the whole State. Such a method of construction is hostile both to the ordinary and usual meaning of the words used, and to all legal precedent and authority. If the additional words had been “ or State of New Tort” no question whatever would have arisen, but that the disjunctive “or” had been used in the ordinary sense of a disjunction signifying a separation, and not a combination. But, apart from this reasoning on phraseology, we maintain that the law construes this covenant as an agreement to refrain from exercising a trade’ within the limits of two separate and distinct areas, and though the restraint as to the latter limit be bad, yet the law will still afford relief for a violation of the covenant as regards the former valid limit. (Story on Contracts, Sec. 640, and notes 2 and 4; Archibald v. Thomas, 3 Cow. 290; Smith v. Parkhurst, 3 Atk. * p. 136; Jadcson v. Showl, 29 Cal. 272; Saunders v. Clark, Id. 305; People v. Pickett, 8 Cow. 226.)

The contract being illegal confers no right upon the plaintiff. It is in restraint of trade, and void as against public policy. (Wright v. Pyder, 36 Cal. 356, and the various cases therein enumerated.)

This proposition is not controverted, but it is insisted that the-covenant is valid, inasmuch as the “City and County of San Francisco ” may be taken by itself and is a “reasonable restricted limit.” . To this we reply: The contract is an entire one and cannot be separated. An entire contract that is void in part is entirely void, and cannot be enforced. (Bobyvl'West, 4 N. H. 290; Crawford v. Morrell, 8 Johns. 253; Mechelen v. Wallace, 7 Ad. A. E. 49; Ihomas v. Williams, 10 B. & C. 671.)

We do not understand the case of People v. Pickett, cited by appellant, as deciding that a lease, void by the Statute of Frauds, is valid so as to confer any affirmative rights upon tbe tenant. It merely bolds tbat, for tbe purpose of determining sucb tenancy, tbe entry by tbe tenant shall be held lawful so as to entitle him to a proper notice to quit, carrying out tbe doctrine previously held, tbat for sucb purposes a tenancy at will shall be deemed a tenancy from year to year. Tbe three cases last cited by us above are in point, tbat a contract void in part by reason of tbe Statute of Frauds cannot be made tbe basis of a cause of action,

This is not a case where tbe rules applicable to construction of ambiguous words or phrases may be invoked. There is nothing ambiguous in tbe contract; no word or phrase tbat is capable of two interpretations. Tbe only question is whether tbe contract is entire or several. Tbat it is entire, we think, is apparent upon its examination.

There is only one consideration for tbe entire agreement of Bonnet, viz: two thousand dollars. There is no sum affixed for tbe sale of tbe merchandise, none for tbe good will, none for tbe covenant not to engage in tbe business in San Francisco, none for tbe covenant not to engage in tbe business in California. Had there been a different valuation affixed to each of these items, tbe appellant might, with some degree of propriety, have argued tbat tbe contracts were several, but in tbe absence thereof, sucb argument is inapplicable. ■. ,