People v. Lynch

Good Law
51 Cal. 15
Supreme Court of CaliforniaJuly 1, 1875No. 4498California7,212 words

Opinion

concurrence Opinion

Wallace, J.

concurring specially:

The “thing wanting,” both before and after the passage of that act, was uniformity, and for this reason the assessment was not aided by the legislative act referred to.

Had the act been general and prospective, instead of special and retrospective—had it undertaken to provide for assessments of this character to be levied thereafter, not upon a prescribed basis of uniformity, an assessment levied in conformity therewith would have been void. It is not in the legislative authority to dispense with the required uniformity—whether by prospective acts providing for an assessment to be levied in the future, or retrospective acts seeking to impart validity to assessments already levied.

For these reasons I concur in the judgment, upon the ground first discussed by Mr. Justice McKinstby.

concurrence Opinion

Rhodes, J.

also-concurring specially:

lead Opinion

McKinstry, J.

The action is on an alleged assessment for planking Tenth street, from J to N streets, in the city of Sacramento.

As conclusions of law, the court below found that the order of the Board of Trustees, directing the grading and planking was void, because the board did not acquire jurisdiction to make it; that the contract for planking was also void, and that the assessment was void, because the same was not made in pursuance of the city charter. The court further found that all the proceedings had been legalized by the act of the Legislature, approved March 30, 1874, “to legalize the assessment of a street tax in the city of Sacramento,” the first section of which reads:

For the purpose of the present case, I am .willing to admit the entire accuracy of the rule, said by Cooley to be applicable to statutes passed to cure irregularities in the assessment of property for taxation: “If the thing wanting, or which failed to be d&ne, and wrhich constitutes the defect in the proceedings, is something the necessity of which the Legislature might have dispensed with by prior statute, then it is not beyond the power of the Legislature to dispense with it by subsequent statute.” (Const. Lim.…

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