Pico

Nothing remained in the defendants but the right of action for redemption. (Hughes v. Davis, 40 Cal. 120 ; Higgins v. Higgins, 46 Ibid. 264 .)

Upon the defendants’ own theory, therefore, there is still due from them seven hundred dollars, which amount they never tendered or offered to pay; and although such offer is made in their answer, yet in fact they have not paid it, and the judgment does not require them to pay it, but on the contrary, awards costs to defendants.

V- E. and F. H. Howard, for the Respondents.

The Court finds that the deed of defendants was a mortgage. Once a mortgage, always a mortgage, as between the parties and all subsequent vendees, with notice, which is found in this case. Hughes v. Dams, and Higgins v. Higgins do not affect this principle, and have no application to the case. (Hill on Mort. pp. 85-88.) Possession was sufficient notice to Pico.

On the 8th day of August, 1874, the legal title to the premises in controversy was in Tomasa Badilla. She deraigned from Jesus Peralta, who acquired his rights under deeds from the *208 defendant, and his wife, the intervener, absolute in form, but intended as mortgages to secure the payment of money borrowed…