Grant

1st. The instrument annexed to the complaint, and marked “ Exhibit D,” is a deed of trust, which authorizes the trustees therein named to sell and convey the lands described, upon default in the payment of the note or interest, and is not a mortgage requiring judicial foreclosure. (Koch v. Briggs, 14 Cal. 256 .) The doctrine of Koch v. Briggs has never been overthrown by subsequent decisions.

2nd. Appellant’s second point is, that the promissory note “ C ” —secured by the deed, “ D ”—was barred by limitation before “ default ” was declared by the Board of Directors of the Savings and Loan Society, and that all remedy against the security for its payment became barred with the note.

Section 17 of the Statute of Limitations, which was in operation before the Codes, provided that actions could “ only be commenced ” within the periods mentioned. (Hittell’s G. L., p. 635.) The provision of the Code of Civil Procedure is: “ The periods prescribed for the commencement of actions are * * * within four years, an action upon any contract, obligation, or liability, upon any instrument in writing,” etc. The Statute of Limitations is to be employed as a shield, and not as a sword; as a means…