Ex parte Kearny

Good Law
55 Cal. 212
Supreme Court of CaliforniaJuly 1, 1880No. 10,515California6,232 words

Opinion

lead Opinion

McKinstry, J.

The Police Court of the City and County of San Francisco is an “ inferior court ” of limited jurisdiction, whose powers are conferred, and whose duties and mode of procedure are prescribed, by statute, and to which the rule applies that the evidence of its proceedings must affirmatively show jurisdiction of the person'of the defendant, and over the subject-matter. The remark to the contrary in Ex parte Murray, 45 Cal. 455 , is dictum. The only question there was, whether the judgment should have shown on its face the particular offense of which the petitioner had been found guilty ? There is frequently a difficulty in ascertaining whether a particular court is or is not u inferior ” within the meaning of that term as used in the books. In England, probably all courts, except the King’s *215 at Westminstcr, the King’s Bench, Court of Bankruptcy, Exchequer, and Chancery, are treated as inferior courts. (Cowen and Hill’s Notes Phillips’ Ev., 4th American ed., vol. 2, p. 105.)

It is clear that courts invested with a general common-law jurisdiction in laAV or in equity are, when exercising their general jurisdiction, superior courts, Avithin the meaning of the rule Avhich accords…

concurrence Opinion

Thornton, J.

I concur in the reasoning and the result reached in the opinion signed by my brethren, McKinstry and others. In doing so I desire to add that I do not wish to be considered as concluded by anything contained in that opinion, as to a judgment or sentence of any court of criminal jurisdiction known to the Constitution and laws of this State. I am strongly inclined to the opinion that the same result must be reached upon a so-called judgment of any of the Superior Courts, when there is nothing in the shape of law to maintain the judgment. It must be remembered that we have no criminal common law. All our public offenses or crimes are statutory. Unless a statute exists making an act a crime or a public offense, (see Penal Code, § 6) no one can be adjudged to suffer punishment for the commission of it, however heinous it may be when tested according to the ordinary criterion of public duty or public obligation. To hold that any court of criminal jurisdiction can adjudge an act, not a public offense by statute, deserving of punishment and sentence, and commit to prison or fine for the commission of such an act, which, in such a condition of the law, is innocent, and that the person so…

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