Bobbery—Striking Out Evidence—Objection to Evidence.—The Court below denied defendant’s motion to strike out the evidence of certain witnesses for the prosecution, to which no objection had been made. Held: That in such a case a motion to strike out should not be allowed.

Id.—Id.—Id.—The practice, whether in civil or criminal cases, of deliberately-permitting evidence to be given without objection in the first instance, and then moving to strike it out on grounds which might readily have been availed of to exclude it when offered, is not to be tolerated.

Id.—Competency of Evidence.—Circumstantial Evidence.—The evidence referred to consisted of circumstances more or less direct, tending to connect the defendant with the perpetration of the robbery with which he was charged, and to establish his guilt—as, for instance, that he was seen at different places not far distant from the robbery and on days not remote from the day on which the crime was committed; that he was seen in company with Hamilton, an accomplice, who was used as a witness on behalf of the State; that they were armed, one with a rifle and a pistol and the other with a shotgun; that they had the same dog with them; that they stopped at certain houses, procured meals there, and walked off in certain directions; that they made various inquiries, and otherwise conducted themselves in a suspicious manner.

Held: These were all circumstances in the case, which were properly submitted to the jury, and should have been admitted, even if regularly objected to by the defendant at the proper time.

Id.—Identity—Belief.—The witnesses expressed the belief that the defendant was the person they had seen, but did not positively and beyond a doubt identify him.

Held: The evidence was sufficiently certain, respecting the identity of the defendant, to go to the jury, and it was for the jury to say what weight it was entitled to.

Id.—Id.—Identity of Name—Impeachment of Witness—Becord of Former Conviction.—For the purpose of impeaching the defendant, who had testified as a witness in his own behalf, there was read in evidence, over the objection of the defendant, the record of conviction of one Frank Bollins of the crime of assault with intent to kill, and a witness testified, that while he was an officer at the State Prison at San Quentin the defendant was an inmate of the prison, and was known by the name of Frank Bollins among the officers, as well as upon the records of that institution.

Held: The evidence was sufficient to establish the identity of the defendant with the said Frank Bollins.

Id.—Identity of person is presumed from identity of name.

Id.—Impeachment of Witness—Uncontradicted Evidence — Query. The defendant was asked, over the objections of his attorneys: “Were you convicted of an assault with intent to kill, in San Mateo County ? If so, when ?

Held: It is not necessary to decide whether the question was a proper one or not. It is sufficient that the fact of the former conviction of the defendant was proved by a certified copy of the record, as well as by the evidence of a witness, and there was no evidence to the contrary. But on this point see People v. Chin Moolc Sow, 51 Cal. 600.

Id.—Testimony of .Accomplice—Corroboration.—There was sufficient evidence in corroboration of the testimony of the accomplice to justify a conviction.