These appeals will be considered together. No. 9560 is an appeal from an order refusing to admit an instrument to probate as the will of the deceased; and No. 9735 is an appeal from an order admitting an instrument to probate.

The following appears in the bill of exceptions in appeal No. 9560:—

*587 A witness testified as follows:—

It was also in evidence that the sister referred to, Anna J., was in indigent circumstances, and that the deceased had made remittances to her for her support. The deed of gift which was referred to was executed (except as to delivery) and was acknowledged; it was not delivered, but was found in a box of the deceased. A witness testified that he suggested to the deceased that he should send the deed to the sister, to which deceased replied: “Well, you know she will have it, and you know she will have abundance.”

The court found that the instrument (copy of deed and letter) was entirely written and signed by the hand of the deceased; that it was not dated, and was not a will; therefore, the court refused its probate.

In the case presented in the appeal, No. 9735, the deed itself, acknowledged as a deed and witnessed (not the copy and letter), was offered for probate. The court found its execution by the deceased, in the presence of the two witnesses; that he declared the same to them to be his will; that they signed the same in *588 his presence and at his request; and admitted the same to probate.

We are of opinion that the order in each case was erroneous. The deed (proposed in Mo. 9735) was a deed of gift, and contained no words of testamentary character. It was invalid as a deed, because not delivered; it was not a- will, because it expressed no design to be other than a deed. The evidence was insufficient to show its execution as a will; it was not olographic, and the evidence was insufficient to show that the deceased declared to the witnesses that the paper was his will. The instrument proposed in Mo. 9560, taken as an entirety, should have been admitted. It was written entirely by the hand of the deceased, it was signed by him, and a date appears at the commencement. Meither the copy of the deed nor the letter, taken by itself, constitute a will; the one is not testamentary in its character, the other has no date; but taking them together as the deceased left them, forming one document, it is complete. The first part furnishes the date, and the latter the testamentary character. We think the following words clearly show an animus testandi, viz.: “ We all know life is uncertain, and we don’t know the moment we may be called away.....I therefore want you to know you are provided for under any circumstances.....My intention is to provide for you while I live, the same as I have always done; and hereafter, if it should please God to call me away, you will have your own property to depend on, sufficient to make you independent while you live.”

Doubtless the deceased had it in his mind, when he executed the deed; to send it to his sister at some time, thus vesting the title in her in his lifetime; but for some reason he retained it, perhaps so that he could sell the property, if he should desire, but that he intended she should have the property upon his death, if not sold by him, is to us very clear. Such being the case, and the instrument being executed with the formalities required by law, it is entitled to be admitted to probate.

The orders and motions in both appeals are reversed and the matters are remanded with directions to the court below to refuse probate of the deed by itself, and to admit to probate the copy of deed and letter, being the instrument referred to as proposed in appeal Mo. 9560.

*589 Morrison, C. J., McKee, J., Thornton, J., and McKinstry, J., concurred.

Rehearing denied.