Victoria Murphey appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for a judicial recommendation against deportation. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Murphey is a Filipino citizen who has been in the United States since 1985. ■ In late 1989, she pleaded guilty to the crime of importation of a controlled substance. Pri- or to sentencing, the Immigration and Naturalization Service served her with an order to show cause, asserting that she was subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(4)(B) which defines as deportable any alien who is “convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after entry.”

After sentencing, she filed a motion for a judicial recommendation against deportation (JRAD) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (b)(2). Before the district court decided her motion, the INS served her with an additional charge of deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(ll) which defines as de-portable any alien who “at any time has been convicted of a violation of ... any law ... [of] the United States ... relating to a controlled substance.” At that time, § 1251(b)(2), the JRAD-issuing authority, did “not apply in the case of any alien who is charged with being deportable from the United States under subsection (a)(ll) of [§ 1251].” Consequently, the district court denied the JRAD motion, finding that it lacked “the authority to make such a recommendation” due to the (a)(ll) exception of § 1251(b)(2). Murphey timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court mistakenly believed it lost jurisdiction to grant a JRAD as applied to the proceedings initiated under subsection (a)(4)(B), the “aggravated felony” provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1251 , when an additional charge was filed under subsection (a)(ll), the “controlled substance” provision. Since the submission of this appeal, any question concerning the district court’s authority to grant such a recommendation has been resolved by passage of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 505 (a), 104 Stat. 4978 , 5050 (1990).

At the time Murphey filed her JRAD motion, the relevant subsections of 8 U.S.C. § 1251 provided:

The Immigration Act of 1990 altered subsection (b) to read:

Pub.L., § 505(a), 104 Stat. at 5050.

Sentencing judges therefore were divested of the authority to issue JRADs, and Congress clarified the inapplicability of the pardon provision to aliens convicted of drug-related offenses and aggravated felonies. Any uncertainty as to a court’s authority to issue a JRAD as to an (a)(4)(B) “aggravated felony” charge, despite a pending (a)(ll) “controlled substance” charge, was thus resolved. A court does not have this authority under the amended statute.

The Act further provides that the amendment “shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to convictions entered before, on, or after such date.” Pub.L., § 505(b), 104 Stat. at 5050. As a result of that amendment, any question in this case as to the district court’s authority under the prior wording of the statute to issue a JRAD as to Mur-phey’s (a)(4)(B) charge when she was charged under both (a)(4)(B) and (a)(ll) has become moot because, even if previously it was permitted, such authority no longer exists. Consequently, the JRAD denial is not a correctable error. The judgment of the district court therefore is AFFIRMED.

. It is unclear whether a denial of a motion for a recommendation against deportation is an ap-pealable order. See United States v. Gonzalez, 582 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 (7th Cir.1978) (court opined that the case might not be ripe as recommendation is only initial step in deportation proceedings; on the other hand, as the deportation proceedings may take place long after sentencing, there should be a prompt opportunity to correct a district judge’s mistaken belief that he could not make a recommendation). We need not decide this “uncharted jurisdictional issue," id. at 1165 , however, as the government is agreeable to treating the appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus to the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).