Pledge—Voidable Purchase by Pledgee—Election of Pledgor—Unreasonable Delay — Ratification.—When a pledgee purchases the pledge at a sale of which the pledgor has notice, the pledgor has a right of election to treat the sale as invalid, but loses that right by failing to exercise it within a reasonable time after knowledge of the fact. The right is lost by such unreasonable delay, as a rule of law, and not as an inference of fact as to ratification of the sale by the pledgor.

Id. —Instruction as to Unreasonable Delay — Question of Law and Fact. —If the facts are undisputed, the judge may instruct the jury as to what delay of the pledgor, in avoiding a purchase of a pledge of stocks by the pledgee at his own sale, is unreasonable; but if the facts are disputed, it is proper to submit the question to the jury. An undisputed delay of two months after being informed of the facts, and until the stocks sold had risen to a very high price, would warrant an instruction to the jury as matter of law that the delay was unreasonable.

Id. — Instruction—Charging as to Matters of Fact—Ratification of Sale of Pledge—Election. —Instructions that the jury may find a ratification by the pledgor of the pledgee’s purchase of the pledge at his own sale, from an unreasonable delay to object, after being informed of the purchase, or when the pledgor, with knowledge of his rights, has treated with the pledgee for a repurchase of part of the property, are correct, and do not charge the jury as to matters of fact. Ratification is here used as the equivalent of an election to treat the sale as valid; and the sufficiency and binding force of the election is matter of law.

Id. — Questions of Law and Fact. — In one connection a word or phrase may stand for a fact, while in another the same word or phrase may designate a conclusion of law.

Id. — Ratification how Constituted—Consideration—Knowledge of Rights — Presumption. — Ratification by a pledgor of a purchase of the pledge by the pledgee at his own sale does not require a consideration or a new contract. If the pledgor, after the sale, treats with the pledgee for a repurchase, without objection to the sale and with full knowledge of his rights, it is a sufficient manifestation of his election to treat the sale as valid; and if a knowledge of the law by the pledgor is essential to a ratification, it will be presumed that he knew the law, when the contrary does not appear. An unrebutted presumption as to knowledge of the law has the same force as an admission of such knowledge.

Id. — Retraction of Election.—A sufficient election by the pledgor to treat a purchase of the pledge by the pledgee at his own sale as valid cannot afterwards be retracted; nor can an election to disaffirm the sale be retracted or renewed at a later date for the purpose of increasing damages.

Instructions — Inaccuracy.—Inaccuracy of an instruction in stating the grounds of a rule of law is harmless, if it state the rule correctly in its substance.

Id, —Instructions Assuming Facts—Harmless Error. — An instruction erroneously assuming a fact in favor of the appellant cannot be complained of by him, and the assumption of an undisputed fact in an instruction cannot injure the appellant.

Id. — Abstract Instruction. — A purely abstract instruction which could not have misled the jury, in view of all circumstances of the case, will not be reviewed upon appeal.