The defendant was convicted of the crime of “burning insured property,” with intent to injure and defraud the insurers, and he appeals from the judgment, and an order denying him a new trial.

The property burned was a two-story wooden building and its contents, situate just outside of the limits of the city of San Bernardino, and known as the Arctic saloon building. It was owned by the defendant and one Myers, and the lower story was used by them as a saloon, and the upper story as a lodging-house. The building was insured for one thousand dollars, and the furniture, stock, *652 and fixtures for a like sum. The fire occurred between one and three o’clock in the morning of January 1,1889.

The defendant was not at the saloon at the time the C- fire was started, and had not been there for some hours before. He could not therefore himself have set the fire. This was not controverted at the trial, but it was claimed that he must have procured some one else to set it.

The evidence against the defendant was wholly circumstantial, and most of it was admitted against his objections and exceptions. Among other items of evidence objected to were the following: The prosecution called as a witness a woman known as Josie McFarland, who testified that she was a “sporting lady,” and kept a “ sporting-house” in the city of San Bernardino. She then proceeded to relate certain conversations, tending more or less to criminate defendant, some of which she said she had with him at her house eight or ten days before, and some eight or ten days after, the fire. The defendant was called as a witness in his own behalf, and denied that he had the conversations or made the statements related by the witness Josie, but admitted, on cross-examination, that he might have been at her house at the times named by her. The following questions were then asked and answered:—-

The objection to the last question was, that it was “ irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial, and not responsive to the examination in chief, and not proper cross-examination, and is asked simply for the purpose of having a tendency to degrade the character of the witness,”

*653 It is now urged for the appellant that his objections to each of the foregoing questions should have been sustained, and that the rulings against him operated to his manifest prejudice.

That the rulings were erroneous is too clear, in our opinion, to admit of debate. The defendant was a married man, and the fact that he went to and remained overnight in a house of ill-fame was greatly to his discredit, and undoubtedly tended to prejudice the jury against him. It did not, however, tend in the slightest degree to show that he caused his saloon to be burned six months before, or that he ever made any admissions relating thereto. The evidence must have been offered for the sole purpose of discrediting the witness; but for that purpose, or any other, it was clearly incompetent and inadmissible. (Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 674 .)

The prosecution also called as a witness one James Tye, who testified, among other things, that he was tending bar for Tiley and Myers during the last days of December, 1888; that at the time of the fire he was present in the bar-room of the Arctic saloon, and that he knew a man by the name of Brock O’Neal. He was then asked and answered as follows:—

The defendant, in his examination in chief, testified that he never set the fire, or caused it to be set, and never had any knowledge whatever as to the cause of the fire; and that he never sent to Brock O’Neal any bottle or package by James Tye, or any one else.

On cross-examination, he was asked:—•

In rebuttal, the prosecution called two witnesses to prove that the defendant had known O’Neal for a considerably longer time than that stated by him on his cross-examination. This testimony was objected to, “on the ground that it is not proper rebuttal testimony; on the further ground that it is irrelevant and immaterial; if it is asked for the purpose of impeaching the *655 defendant, it is wholly upon a collateral and immaterial matter, and the proper foundation has not been laid.”

The objections were overruled, and these rulings are assigned as error.

We are unable to see that this rebuttal testimony was relevant or material for any purpose, other than to discredit and impeach the defendant. But, as said in People v. Dye, 75 Cal. 112 : “A party cannot cross-examine his adversary’s witness upon irrelevant matters, for the purpose of elicting something to be contradicted. And if such matters are drawn out, the court should stop the inquiry there. It is well settled that a witness cannot be impeached by contradicting him upon collateral matters.” In our opinion, the rulings complained of were erroneous, and the evidence thus wrongly admitted tended to prejudice the defendant before the jury.

Other errors are assigned, but we do not think it necessary to notice them particularly. For the errors above noted, we advise that the judgment and order be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.

Hayne, C., and Foote, C., concurred.

The Court. — For reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the judgment and order are reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.