Bull

I concur. It does not seem possible to avoid the conclusion that the law of California on the subject of voluntary conveyances by insolvent debtors is such as in the opinion of Justice Garoutte it is declared to be. But I cannot refrain from expressing the belief that it is most unfortunate that the court should be forced to that conclusion.

When an insolvent debtor makes a gift of his property to a donee of his own selection, there can be but one result so far as his creditors are concerned; they are necessarily deprived of what is rightfully theirs, and the law ought to pronounce such a transaction ipso facto fraudulent and void as to them.

Our legislature, however, has deliberately chosen to make the rights of creditors in such case depend, not upon the proof of facts susceptible of demonstration, and from -which the injury is a necessary result, but upon proof of the secret intent of the debtor; in other words, upon the whim of a jury.

*304 Such a law invites fraud, puts a premium upon perjury, and multiplies fruitless litigation. It ought to be changed, but the legislature alone has the power to change it. In the mean time the courts should give the utmost force and effect…

— This is an appeal from an order granting defendants a new trial.

The action was brought by plaintiff, a judgment creditor, to set aside two certain deeds of gift made by defendant Watson A. Bray, the judgment debtor, to Julia A. Bray, his wife, May 20, 1880, and August 3, 1881, respectively, of lands in Contra Costa County, as being void against prior creditors. Plaintiff’s debt had been reduced to judgment; execution was issued thereon, and returned wholly unsatisfied.

In the lower court plaintiff had judgment as prayed 'for, declaring said deeds null and void as against his judgment, and that he be entitled to enforce his execution against the property in said deeds described. Defendants moved for a new trial, and their motion was granted, upon the ground that the findings as filed omitted to find upon the issue of intent raised by the pleadings in the case; that is to say, there is no finding on the issue made by the pleadings, whether the con *288 veyanceaí from Bray to his wife, referred to in the pleadings, ware made or accepted with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the plaintiff or other creditors of said Bray.

Tlie question presented by this appeal is, therefore,…