Thompson

I concur in Mr. Justice De Haven’s opinion úpon the first ground discussed.

The judgment in Laughlin v. Thompson was a valid *319 binding judgment, but in all respects save as to costs, is fully satisfied, for the property has been returned to Laughlin. Why should he object because Thompson returned to him the property sooner than was required ? If Thompson had retained the property and returned it after judgment, that would have strictly comported with the requirements of the judgment. Is he to suffer a grievous wrong because he was too alert in giving Laughlin his rights? If Laughlin, vi et armis, had taken the property from Thompson, and thus have prevented Thompson from returning it, could it be pretended that he would be entitled to execution to recover its value? The law contemplates the recovery of the property or its value; never both property and value. The execution should be quashed on motion. It should be restrained, because it would be unconscionable to satisfy it by sale of Thompson’s property.

I dissent. This appeal is by the defendant from a judgment that he be perpetually enjoined from levying any execution or other process upon any of the property of the plaintiff for the collection of one thousand dollars, the value of lumber for which he, defendant, obtained judgment in the superior court of Los Angeles County in the suit therein wherein defendant herein was plaintiff and plaintiff herein defendant; and that defendant herein further be enjoined from attempting to or encumbering the property of plaintiff herein by any lien, by reason or virtue of said judgment, to the extent of said one thousand dollars, or from demanding any sum of money by reason or by virtue of said judgment to the extent of one. thousand dollars, value of said property; and defendant herein was required to satisfy said judgment in said superior court to the extent of said one thousand dollars.

Professor Pomeroy says: “It was a settled doctrine of the equitable jurisdiction, and is still the subsisting doctrine except where it has been modified or abrogated by *320 statute, or has become obsolete through the enlarged powers of the law courts to grant new trials, that where the legal judgment was…

On November 8, 1889, in the superior court of Los Angeles County, the defendant herein obtained a judgment against the plaintiff in this action for the recovery of the possession of a certain lot of lumber, or in case a delivery thereof could not be had, then for its value, found to be $1,000, and also for $250 damages, and costs of the action.

This action is brought to enjoin the enforcement of said judgment for damages, and also the alternative part for the value of the lumber. The court below rendered judgment enjoining the defendant from collecting the said sum of one thousand dollars, and requiring him *315 to satisfy the judgment to that extent. The defendant appeals.

The court below found, and indeed the fact is not denied in the answer, that during the pendency of the action brought by the defendant against the plaintiff, but after issue joined therein, the plaintiff returned to the defendant all of the lumber sued for. It also appears that during the trial, which resulted in the judgment referred to, the plaintiff herein offered to show this fact, but the court held the evidence inadmissible under the pleadings.

The findings further show that after the rendition of…