Harris

I concur in the judgment, and in all that is said in the opinion of Mr. Justice Harrison, except that relating to De Witt v. Wright, 57 Cal. *73 576 . In that case the question as to the proper construction of section 460 of the Code of Civil Procedure was determined after full argument and careful consideration, and I think it should be adhered to, whether it agrees with our views of the section or not. It is a matter of very little importance which of the two constructions is placed upon the statute, but it is desirable for the information and guidance of the pleader, that a construction once made should be adhered to.

The complaint, according to the rule laid down in De Witt v. Wright, 57 Cal. 576 , is insuEcient; but the defendant waived the objection and cured the defect by alleging in his answer that he, in speaking to Loheide for the purpose of informing him as to the true character of the plaintiff, said: “ I believe she [meaning the plaintiff] is a thief.” The answer leaves no doubt that whatever was said referred to plaintiff, and that Loheide so understood it.

Rehearing denied.

Action for slander.

It is alleged in the complaint “ that on or about the fifteenth day of April, 1887, at the city of Eureka, in the county of Humboldt, and state of California, the defendant, in the presence and hearing of divers good and worthy persons, spoke the following words of and concerning the plaintiff: She is a damned thief.'

The appellant contends that this allegation is insufficient, and that the demurrer to the complaint should have been sustained, for the reason that it is not alleged that the words charged to have been spoken were understood by those who heard them to refer to the plaintiff.

Under the common law, a declaration for slander had become so artificial and prolix, by reason of the technical objections to its form that the courts were wont to sustain in respect to the distinctions to be observed between the averment, the inducement, the colloquium, and the innuendo, and the requirements of strictly confining to each and elaborately presenting therein the matter that belonged to that head, that the action, instead of being the mode by which a plaintiff could obtain satisfaction for an injury he had sustained, was often made the means by which justice…