"There are two appeals in this case, upon distinct records. No. 13116 is from the final judgment, and upon the judgment roll. No. 13309 is from an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial, upon a record consisting of a statement of the case in addition to the judgment roll.

“ On the appeal from the judgment, it is contended that the court erred in overruling the defendant’s de *136 murrer to the complaint, and that the findings do not support the judgment. On the appeal from the order, the errors assigned are errors of law occurring at the trial.

(The foregoing is adopted from the opinion of Commissoner Vanclief, delivered in Department.)

It is testified that the phrase “ S/87 wheat,” used in the contract sued on, is an abbreveiation which origi *141 nated in the call board, where, from the necessities of business, such a phrase is understood to mean what it would take quite a numbej of words to express in detail. It was testified by most of the witnesses that “ S/87 wheat ” meant that the seller was to have the season of 1887 in which to complete his contract, and that it meant also that the wheat should be “ number one white wheat.” There was also testimony to the point that the said phrase “ S/87 wheat” does not mean that the one party is to actually deliver the amount of wheat stated in the contract, or that the other party is bound to receive it all and pay the whole amount at the stated price; but that the seller is simply to produce what are denominated “call-board contracts” for the wheat, instead of the wheat itself. And owing to the peculiar character of the contract here sued on, and the testimony as to the technical meaning of some of its terms, we think that the court could not arrive at a just decision of the case without knowing whether the printed matter was a part of the contract, whether it should be considered as a “ board contract,” and whether the phrase “ S/87 wheat has any meaning other than that given to it by said board, and what that meaning is. The solution of these questions involves matters of fact to be determined upon evidence. We think, therefore, that the testimony of plaintiff Berry when testifying for plaintiffs was properly admitted over the objections of defendant, and that the court erred in sustaining objections to the questions asked by defendant of the witness Bonney, as above stated, and also in sustaining the objections to the introduction of the rules and regulations of the stock exchange and call board. The contract may turn out to be a pure gambling contract, and therefore void; but from any point of view, the said evidence offered by defendant should have been admitted.

Judgment and order reversed, and a new trial ordered.