This is an action for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. The material allegations of the complaint are as follows:—■

The defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute *434 a cause of action, the demurrer was overruled, defendant offered no further defense to the action, the court upon the proofs taken found the facts alleged in the complaint .to be true, and judgment was entered in favor of the tplaintiff, dissolving the bonds of matrimony. From this judgment the defendant has appealed, and now insists that the demurrer ought to have been sustained, because the facts alleged are insufficient to support a finding of extreme cruelty-.

Gur statute provides that “ extreme cruelty is the infliction of grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering upon the other by one party to the marriage.”

Courts and elementary writers have found it impossible to define with precision what acts will constitute extreme cruelty, and it would be idle for us to review the decisions cited, because they are as variant as the language of the several statutes upon which they were founded. The habits and dispositions of different married persons vary so much that it is impossible to lay down any universal''rule for the determination of what indignities should be regarded as grounds of divorce under the statute. The legislature has necessarily employed general words, and left each case to be determined, according to its own peculiar circumstances, by the good sense and judgment of courts and juries. “ Whether in any given case there has been inflicted this ‘ grievous mental suffering; is a pure question .of fact, to be deduced from all the circumstances of each particular case, keeping always in view the intelligence, apparent refinement, and delicacy of sentiment of the complaining party.” (Barnes v. Barnes, ante, p. 171.)

We . cannot, as matter of law, say that the conduct charged in the complaint did not inflict upon the plaintiff grievous mental suffering. The court below has found as a fact that it did, and it is the province of that court, and not our own, to determine the facts. The evidence is not in the record, and the finding is conclusive. We presume the court considered the character of the parties, and was guided by the statute and its *435 sense of right and justice, and not by any chivalric sentiment, in awarding a decree to the plaintiff.

The attorneys for appellant attempt to excuse his conduct on the ground that the acts imputed to him were not willfully or deliberately done to annoy or vex the plaintiff, — that he did not suppose any publicity would be given to them, or that his wife would be told about them; but the law will not condone a violation of the marriage obligation on any such ground. His conduct being voluntary and inconsistent with marital integrity, it is conclusively presumed that he intended the natural and ordinary effect thereof upon his wife. He, better than any one else, is supposed to know the effect a disclosure of his acts would have upon her; he took the chances of being found out, and must suffer the consequences. His threat to turn his wife out upon the world penniless, unless she assisted in saving him from a prosecution for his offense, did not indicate any contrition on his part, or that his consideration for the feelings of plaintiff would be any greater in the future than it had been in the past.

Judgment affirmed.

Harrison, J., and Garoutte, J., concurred.