Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granting a new trial.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The following are the instructions to the jury referred to in the opinion: —

Instructions aslced by plaintiff and given:—■

“ 1. It appears in this case that on the fifth day of December, 1887, a petition was filed by certain creditors of Edgar Sessions, in involuntary insolvency, against the said Sessions, and that such proceedings were had therein that afterwards he was adjudged an insolvent, and an assignment of his property was duly made by the clerk of the superior court on the twentieth day of December, 1887. If, therefore, you find from the evidence that said Edgar Sessions, within one month prior to the filing of the petition aforesaid, assigned and transferred to Whittier, Fuller & Co. the personal property described in the complaint, or any part thereof, and that at the time of making such transfer he was insolvent, and that Whittier, Fuller & Co. knew or had reasonable cause to believe that he was insolvent, and such assignment was made by said Sessions, and received by them, with a view to give them a preference, and to pay the indebtedness of Sessions to them in preference to all other creditors, or with a view of preventing the said property so transferred from coming to his assignee in insolvency, and preventing the same from being distributed ratably among his creditors, or to defeat the objects of, or in any way hinder, impede, or delay the operation of, or to avoid any of the provisions of the insolvency act, such transfer is fraudulent and void, and the plaintiff in this action is entitled to recover the value of the property so transferred.

“2. A debtor is insolvent when he is unable to pay his debts from his own means, in the ordinary course of business, as they became due.

“3. In determining the question of whether the assignment was made with the intent to give a preference, you will consider the evidence in the light of the maxim that a party is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act, and if, from the evidence in this case, and circumstances of the party at the time the transfer was made, you believe that the natural and necessary consequences of the assignment of the property to Whittier, Fuller & Go. was to give a preference to the said Whittier, Fuller & Co. over other creditors, and to prevent a ratable distribution of the property of the debtor among his creditors, it is presumed that the debtor intended to give such preference, or to prevent his property from being distributed ratably among his creditors.

“ 4. In determining the question, of whether Whittier, Fuller & Go. had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time he made the assignment, you will consider all the facts and circumstances by which the parties were surrounded, so far as known to them, or either of them, or to their agent who -was negotiating the assignment. It is not necessary that positive knowledge of the insolvency of the debtor should exist, neither is ignorance of the law any excuse, as all men are presumed to and must know the law. If you believe that the debtor was, at the time, in such a condition financially that he could not pay his debts from his own means as they became due, and the said Whittier, Fuller & Co. knew that fact, or had reasonable cause to believe it, and under such circumstances obtained a transfer of the property mentioned in the complaint in payment of their claim, then you should find for the plaintiff.”

The above portion of the fourth instruction asked for by plaintiff was given, but the court struck out and refused to give the remainder of such fourth instruction, which was as follows: “And the fact that either Sessions or said Whittier, Fuller & Co., or its agent, may have supposed at the time that the debtor would be able, in the course of time, to work out of debt, does not make any difference in the case. The solvency or insolvency of the debtor is not a question of the possibility of his paying off his debts in the course of time, but it is a question of his ability to pay as they become due in the ordinary course of business, and the fact that a debtor transferred a large portion of his property to one creditor without making provision for an equal distribution of its proceeds to all of his creditors, and especially when the transfer is made, not in the due course of business, and is made under the pressure of the creditor, these are all facts and circumstances to be considered by you in determining whether the assignment * -was made or intended as a preference of said Whittier, Fuller & Co., and also in determining whether they had reasonable cause, to believe, at the time, that he was insolvent.”

“ 5. You are further instructed that a transfer of a considerable portion of his property by Sessions to said Whittier, Fuller & Go., the property being of a different character from that which Whittier, Fuller & Co. were accustomed to deal in, and made for the purpose of satisfying a debt, is not a transfer made in the usual and ordinary course of business, and a transfer not in the ordinary course of business is prima facie evidence of fraud.”

The court refused to give the following instructions, asked by plaintiff: —

“ 6. It does not alter the case that Whittier, Fuller & Co. acted in this matter through an agent, for although they were not personally present, yet, having acted through an agent, and especially as they have received the benefit of the assignment, it is in law the same as if they had acted personally in the matter. And furthermore, as a matter of law, Whittier, Fuller & Co. had knowledge of everything known to their agent, and whatever the agent had cause to believe, they had cause to believe; and therefore, if you find that the agent knew or had reasonable cause to believe that Sessions was insolvent at the time said transfer was made to said firm, and that such transfer and payment was made with a view to prevent said property from being distributed ratably among his creditors, or to defeat the object of, or in any way hinder, impede, or delay the operation of, or to evade any of the provisions of the Insolvent Act, such transfer is void, and you should find for plaintiff for the amount stipulated, to wit, $856.99, with interest thereon at the rate of seven per cent per annum from the twenty-sixth day of November, 1887. The court instruct the jury in this case to return a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of $856.99, with interest thereon at the rate of seven per cent from the twenty-sixth day of November, 1887.”

The following instructions were given on behalf of defendants: —

“ 1. The question of fraudulent intent is one of fact, and not of law. The jury are exclusive judges of all questions of fact.”

“ 3. You are further instructed, in this case, no actual fraud is charged against these defendants, but the complaint simply charges that the assignment in question was made to defendants by Sessions, and was accepted by these defendants with a view to give a preference to defendants, with a view to prevent the property so transferred from coming to the assignee of said Sessions in insolvency, and to prevent the same from being distributed ratably among his creditors, and to defeat the objects of the Insolvent Act of 1880; and that the defendants had reasonable cause to believe, and knew, that said Sessions was insolvent, and that the transfer was made for the purpose mentioned. Now, if you believe from the evidence that defendants had not reasonable cause to believe as charged, and had no other intent than to collect an honest debt due them by Sessions, and had no intent of defeating the insolvent law, then you must find for the defendants.

“ 4. Even if you believe from the evidence that Sessions was insolvent at the time of the transfer, and even if he did make the transfer with intent to prefer the defendants to other creditors, if you believe from the evidence that the transfer was made for a valid debt to defendants, and that there was no intent on the part of the defendants to defeat the operation of the insolvent law, and no reasonable cause on their part to believe as charged, you must find for the defendants.

“5. If you believe from the evidence that Sessions did not transfer the property with the view or intention to give preference to defendants, it makes no difference what were the views or motives of the defendants in receiving the property, or what they suspected or believed about the solvency of Sessions, And you should find for the defendants.”

“10. If you believe from the evidence that Sessions, had means or resources of his own to pay his debts as they became due in the ordinary course of business, though he may not have had money in his possession or in bank to meet them, or to pay a particular debt when'due, he was not insolvent at the time he made the transfer to defendants.”

“12. You are instructed that the plaintiff admits that Sessions was, at the time of the transfer in question, indebted to defendants in the sum of $900, and that defendants accepted the goods to the amount of $856.99 in payment of that debt.”