Douglass

The defendant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny, charged to have been committed April 9, 1892, in Tehama county, by feloniously stealing, taking, and carrying away one cow, the property of H. C. Wilson.

The information was filed April 29,1892, and on May 4th the defendant was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty to the charge. On May 9th, by order of court, the trial of the case was set for June 8tli. On the last-named day, on motion of the district attorney, the trial was postponed to a day to be thereafter set. On July 2d counsel for defendant moved the court that he be discharged, on the ground that he had not been tried within sixty days after the filing of the information. The motion was denied, and an exception reserved. On August 27th the case was again set for trial on September 21st. At the time so set the trial was commenced, and on the next day concluded with a verdict of “ guilty *3 of grand larceny as charged in the information.” In due time the defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and thereupon'judgment was pronounced that he be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for the term of three years. From this judgment and the order denying his…

I concur in the judgment, and generally in the foregoing opinion. I wish to add, however, that even if it appeared that the court erred in not granting defendant’s motion for a dismissal of the prosecution because of the failure to place him on trial within the time specified in section 1382 of the Penal Code, still, that would not be sufficient ground for a reversal of the judgment. A judgment should not be reversed for such an error, except in a case where, if the motion had been granted, the statute of limitations would have been a bar to a new information or indictment for the same offense. In other cases the remedy for a defendant whose motion for a dismissal has beert^ improperly denied is an application for a writ of habeas corpus before judgment of conviction.