Certiorari—Opening and Extension of Street—Assessment—District Legislation.—The proceedings of the board of supervisors of the city and county of San Erancisco, under the statute of March 6, 1889 (Stats. 1889, p. 70), in passing a resolution of intention to open and extend Market street to the Pacific ocean, and in declaring the exterior boundaries of the district to be affected thereby, are legislative in character, and certiorari will not lie to review them.

Id.—Legislative Functions Not Reviewable.—A writ of review or certiorari will not lie to review the action of an inferior tribunal or board in the exercise of purely legislative functions which are not judicial in their character.

Id.—Notice of Public Work—Constitutional Law.—The notice of public work and its mode of service by posting and publication, required by the statute of March 6, 1889 (Stats. 1889, p. 70), are not violative of any inherent or constitutional right of the persons to be affected thereby, and amount to due process of law.

Id.—“Due Process of Law” Defined—Settled Maxims of Law.—The term “ due process of law, ” in its broad sense, signifies such an exercise of the powers of the government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe.

Id.—Sufficiency of Notice—Assessment and Taxation.—In judging what is due process of law, the sufficiency of the notice must be determined in each case from the particular circumstances of the case in hand, respect being had to the cause and object of the taking. In matters of assessment and taxation the same character of notice is not required as in ordinary actions in a court of justice.

Id.—Personal Service of Process.—In matters of taxation and assessment, the state is not bound to accord personal service of process upon the citizen.

Id.—Eminent Domain—Legislative Question—Power of Court.—The determination as to whether or not the right of eminent domain shall be exercised, and as to what lands are necessary to be taken in the exercise of that right, is a political and legislative question, and not a judicial one. If the use is a public use, the power of the court is confined to seeing that the burdens cast upon the citizen are in conformity with the methods prescribed by the legislature, and that those methods are not in conflict with the fundamental rights of the people.

Id.—Order of Supervisors Condemning Land—Judicial Action—Excess of Jurisdiction.—Order No. 2319 of the board of supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco, purporting to open and extend Market street to the ocean, and declaring that all the land within its exterior boundaries, as extended, “is hereby condemned, appropriated, acquired, set apart, and taken for public use,” is judicial in its nature in so far as it purports to condemn the land described, and to that extent is in excess of the jurisdiction of the board.

Id.—Distinction Between Legislative and Judicial Act.—A legislative act is one which predetermines what the law shall be for the regulation of future cases falling under its provisions, while a judicial act is a determination of what the law is in relation to some existing thing done or happened. Whenever an act determines a question of right or obligation or of property as the foundation upon which it proceeds, such an act is to that extent judicial.