Upon further consideration of this cause in Bank, we are satisfied with the conclusion *136 which was reached by Department One in its opinion filed November 8, 1893, and for the reasons stated in said opinion the judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.

De Haven, J., did not participate in the foregoing decision.

The following is the opinion of Department One-above referred to:

Temple, C.—The general nature of this case is well stated in the first finding of facts, which is as follows:

Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs and sustaining the lien of Johns, but against the claim of the appellant, who appeals from the judgment and an order refusing him a new trial.

It. will be seen that there are some thirty claimants of liens upon the mine for labor performed mostly in the tunnel, but also in a variety of other employments about the mine, and that the work was done at different periods.

Appellant commenced to furnish materials for the construction of the mill, tramway, boarding-house and other buildings July 21,1890, and filed his claim of lien on February 2,1891. Two of the plaintiffs commenced work before he filed his claim of lien, but all the others commenced work after his claim of lien was filed and many after he had commenced his action to foreclose his lien. The plaintiffs in the third action on behalf of lien claimants commenced their work after the plaintiffs in the second suit had filed their notice' of lien. It is obvious at once that this state of things could not exist in a case for the foreclosure of liens for labor and material used in the construction of a building under contract.

The most important question in the case arises from the fact that appellant only claims a lien upon the reduction works, and filed his notice and claim of lien accordingly, while the plaintiffs in the two suits seek to establish liens upon the whole mining claim, including the reduction works, and described it all in their notice and claim of lien.

They contend that the mill, tramway, hoarding-house and other structures described in appellant’s notice and claim of lien constitute a part only of the property for the improvement of which Hayes furnished lumber, and that he cannot have a lien upon a part only of the structures or property constructed, altered, or improved. The trial court sustained this view.

*139 Section 1183 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so far as material here, is as follows:

The use of the phrase “other structure” in the above extract shows that the word “ structure” comprehends all the properties specifically enumerated, and is broad enough to include any similar thing constructed, should the enumeration prove incomplete. Following this with the language “ and any person who” it would seem to show that a mining claim was not included in the structures upon w'hich liens were allowed. And the procedure provided for acquiring liens upon structures are not, in all respects, applicable to those claiming liens upon mining claims. They cannot all date back to the commencement of the work. On a mine the work is always going on; may have commenced before the laborers were born, and may continue indefinitely. There is no special thirty days, therefore, within which lienors must record their notices and claim of lien.

The labor cannot generally be said to have contributed to the creation of the property, or added to its value; on the contrary, it may diminish its value—perhaps render it valueless.

The code does not seem to have provided for all the cases which may arise in regard to liens upon mining *140 claims. We can only follow the procedure so far as applicable. For that purpose the mining claim must stand in the place of the structure as the property to be charged with the lien. It is the property which should be described in the notice and claim of lien under section 1187. There can be no harm in so speaking of it if we do not lose sight of essential differences, when it is necessary to discriminate.

Appellant contends that he furnished materials for the structures he has described in his notice of lien, and under section 1183 he is entitled to a lien upon the property for which he has furnished materials. He therefore insists that although a lien might have been had upon the whole mine—which, howuver, he does not concede—he is entitled to charge the very structures he has contributed to make for the value of his materials.

The same sort of argument might have been made for those who worked in the tunnel had they sought to acquire a lien upon the tunnel only, and those who worked on the ditch and flume had they sought a lien upon those structures only. In such case had each of the supposed liens been foreclosed, and the structures sold to different purchasers and the mine to another, each purchaser might have found himself the owner of property utterly valueless without the other parts. They were all parts of one entire property, and we cannot suppose, unless the language of the statute compels such conclusion, that such a result was contemplated.

One who has built a chimney in a house, or a porch, or a doorstep, has helped to build a structure, to wit: a chimney, a porch, or doorstep; but he cannot acquire a lien upon these specific structures, and by detached sales destroy the value of the claims depending upon liens upon the whole house. A structure may be a part of another larger structure, fend in reference to it constitute but a part of a structure. In such cases it is well settled the lien must cover the entire structure. It was so held in Cox v. Western Pacific R. R., 44 Cal. 28 . See, also, Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. v. Candler, 87 *141 Ga. 241 , in which the following language is quoted with approbation: “A railroad with its depots, bridges, and other appurtenances, is no less an entirety than a dwelling-house with its kitchen, its chimneys, and its doorsteps; and yet no one has ever supposed that a mechanic's lien could be enforced against the doorsteps or chimneys of a dwelling-house, or that they could be sold and removed, to the utter destruction of the whole property.” In that case it was also said, “a verdict and judgment attempting to set up and enforce a lien upon a specified portion of a railroad are void upon their face.” (See, also, Midland Railway Co. v. Wilcox, 122 Ind. 84 .)

In the case at bar the tramway extends to the mouth of the tunnel. To sell it, with a convenient space around it, would be to deprive the owners of the tunnel, and yet not give the tunnel to the purchaser. What would be a convenient space around a structure which can never be of use as a structure? All these structures, severed from the mine, would be valueless as structures.

The question has, I think, been decided by this court. In Dickenson v. Bolyer, 55 Cal. 285 , work had been done upon a dwelling-house situate upon a mining claim, and also upon a tunnel and other portions of the mining claim. Objection was made that the claim of lien filed did not designate the amount and value of the work done on the dwelling-house, and the amount and value of the work done on the tunnel, as required by section 1188 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court said: “It”—the section—“plainly applies only to cases in which one claim is filed against two or more separate and distinct buildings, mining claims, or other improvements owned by the same person, and not to a case where, as here, all the work was performed upon one and the same piece of property, although upon different portions of it.” In Helm v. Chapman, 66 Cal. 291 , it was said a mine or pit may be called a structure, and “ section 1183 does not, it is true, provide for a lien upon mines, but upon ‘mining claims. The lien, if it exists at all, extends to the whole claim. Strictly speaking, of course, a mining *142 claim cannot be constructed, altered, or repaired. The intention of the lawmakers seems to have been to give a lien upon the whole claim for labor performed on and for materials furnished for and used in any structure, or on or in the mining claim.” In Silvester v. Coe Min. Co., 80 Cal. 510 , a contractor had been employed “ to erect hydraulic power hoisting-works and pumping-works building, gallows-frame, and track, lay down a water-pipe, to supply -water to the mine, and to pump out the mine to the third level.” It was contended that.the statute did not give the contractor a lien on the mining claim, but only on the structure he had contracted to construct, alter, and repair, and that his notice and claim of lien being against the mine, and not against the specific structures, were invalid. It is said:

This is a distinct ruling to the effect that a claim of lien for materials furnished, to be used in a building upon a mining claim, should be against the mining claim and not against the specific structure upon the mine.

Appellant further contends that his lien attached before the mill was used in connection with the mine, and before, therefore, it became an appurtenance under section 1183 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or section 661 of the Civil Code. As his lien attached at the time the * mill was commenced, it, of course, antedates its use. But I think, in this case, the mill is not a mere appurtenance for the mine. It is upon the mining claim and like the tunnels, tramways, and roads, is a part of the *143 mine. But conceding it to be an appurtenance, I think this reading of the code too literal. This is to stick in the bark. One contributing labor or materials to a structure must be held to have anticipated its future use. It is necessary to do this in many cases in order to determine what the structure is upon which he is entitled to a lien. A drain to a house may be an appurtenance before either is used. I think the statute would cover a thing as an incident which was exclusively adapted to the use of the principal before actually used.

It is further objected that the title to that portion of the mining claim upon which the mill was located was not acquired until after his lien attached.

Appellant found the corporate defendant in possession of the premises, claiming it all as its mining claim, and furnishing materials to improve its claim; in this action he cannot dispute its title. Title cannot be tried in this form of action.

If these views are correct, appellant has no lien, and is not interested in the other points made.

I advise that the judgment and order be affirmed.