In this case the defendant demurred to the complaint for want of facts; the demurrer was sustained, and, plaintiff declining to amend, final judgment was entered in favor of the defendant, from which the plaintiff appeals. The only question to be decided is, whether the complaint states a cause of action. Its material allegations are that, in the year 1892, the plaintiff was assessor of Butte county; that it was his duty, as assessor, to make and complete the assessment-roll of said county, between the first Monday of March and the first Monday of July; that for such purpose the assistance of deputies was necessary; that the board of supervisors failed to authorize their appointment; that plaintiff appointed four deputies, whose services' were reasonably worth five dollars per diem, which amounted, for the time they were necessarily employed, to two thousand four hundred dollars, which *447 sum he paid them; that he afterwards presented to the board of supervisors a demand properly itemized and verified for said sum, which was rejected.

Upon these facts the appellant contends that he was entitled to judgment against the county for two thousand four hundred dollars, and he bases his claim upon the provisions of sections 3894 and 3895 of the Political Code, which read as follows:

If these sections were still in force they do not apply to the case made by the complaint. Upon any-reasonable construction of their terms, they require an application to the board, to fix the number of deputies to be appointed, and the rate of their compensation, which thereupon becomes a claim in their favor, payable out of the general fund of the county. If, upon such application, the supervisors fail or refuse to make the proper order, a specific remedy is provided in section 3704 of the same code, as follows:

This statutory remedy for the failure to perform a statutory duty was, we think, intended to be exclusive, as it is clearly sufficient. The plaintiff, however, seems to have entirely disregarded it, as well as the reasonable construction of the sections upon which he bases his claim.

But these sections of the Political Code were not in force in 1892. They were a part of the code as originally adopted, and were superseded as to Butte county by special, or local, acts passed in 1874 and 1876 (Stats. 1873-74, p. 734; Stats. 1875-76, p. 753.) By the passage of the County Government Act of 1883 they were repealed altogether. By that act the salaries of all county officers, including assessors, their deputies, and their assistants, were fully regulated, and by section 164 thereof it was provided, in effect, if not in express terms, that they should have no other compensation. (Stats. 1883, p. 361.) These provisions being inconsistent with the provisions of the Political Code relied on by the appellant necessarily repealed them.

That this was the actual intent of the legislature, especially with reference to Butte county, is amply demonstrated by the liberal provision made for the compensation of the assessor in counties of the ninth class, which included Butte county, and no other.

And that the legislature itself has always construed the County Government Act as repealing sections 3894 and 3895 of the Political Code is clearly evinced by the fact that in every revision of that act special provisions for the appointment of deputies applicable to certain classes of counties have been inserted—a proceeding *449 altogether unnecessary if those sections of the Political Code remained in force.

The judgment of the superior court is affirmed.

McFarland, J., Fitzgerald, J., and De Haven, J., concurred.

Garoutte, J., and Harrison, J., concurred in the judgment.