Robinson

I concur in the judgment. I think that section 489 of the Civil Code is, by clear and necessary implication, repealed by section 22 of article XII of the constitution. But I am not strongly impressed with the position of appellant that section 490 is so dependent upon section 489, to which it refers, as that the repeal of the latter necessarily involved and carried with it the repeal of the former. I do not think there is any such dependence manifest from either the subject matter or the provisions of those two sections. To my mind the reference in section 490 to the preceding section is merely in its nature incidental, and not such a bond of union as to make the life of the one measure that of the other. The vital question in the case, in my judgment, and the one giving rise to the greatest difficulty, is whether section 490 was ever intended or designed by the legislature to give to the passenger a stopover privilege, or the right to a stopover ticket. Upon this question, after a somewhat extended examination of the case and the arguments presented, I am not prepared to say that the conclusion reached in this opinion of the court is not the correct one.

I dissent, and, if other duties permit, will hereafter express my views of the case in an opinion. At present I will merely give my conclusions on two points:

1. I think that the ticket purchased by respondent, on its face, and especially when considered in connection with the reasonable regulations of appellant of its business on the various routes from San Francisco to Oakland, Alameda, and other points near the bay, which regulations were well known to respondent, merely gave to the latter the right to go either to Oakland or Alameda, not to both, and when he elected to get off at Oakland the life of the ticket was, ended.

2. A “ stopover” ticket is a thing well known not only in railroad circles, but to the general public—so well known as to have gone into the common dictionaries of the language. It is a ticket which gives one a right “to stop at a station beyond the time of the departure of the train on which one came, with the purpose of continuing one’s journey on a subsequent train.” (Webster’s Dictionary under head “Stop.”) Now, section 490 does not use the phrase “ stopover,” nor does it, in my judgment, use any equivalent words to denote an intention to give to the…

The three principal questions arising in this case were very fully and elaborately argued by counsel, both' orally and in the printed briefs filed prior to its submission, and they were as carefully considered in0the opinion of the court heretofore filed, wherein it was held: 1. That section 490 of the Civil Code is still in force; 2. That it confers stopover privileges upon the holders of the tickets therein provided for; and 3. That the defendant is subject to its provisions. As to these points, our views remain unchanged, and nothing further need be said concerning them. The rehearing, indeed, was ordered with special reference to a question which, although it had been stated in the briefs, had not been discussed at the oral argument, and had been but slightly considered in the opinion of the court. This question, to which the reargument was practically *538 confined, may be briefly stated as follows: Did the plaintiff, by purchasing and accepting a ticket which, in terms and in fact, gave him the alternative right to go to Oakland or Alameda, become thereby entitled to go to Oakland, stop off there, and afterwards resume his journey to Alameda? When this question is considered…