Fairchild

I concur, but solely upon the authority of the Kennedy case.

Appeal from judgment of superior court in mandamus and from order denying a new trial.

Plaintiff was, and for more than ten years before the fourteenth day of September, 1892, ha,d been, a principal teacher in the public schools of San Francisco, elected for no definite term. Upon that day she obtained a leave of absence until July 1, 1893. Upon the expiration of her leave of absence she reported for duty, and asked to be allowed to resume the position of principal of the Potrero school, which, position she was filling at the time of her vacation. That position had been filled, during her absence, by the election of another teacher to it. Her request was, therefore, refused, and she was assigned to the head of the day school substi *93 tute class, under rule 124 of the board of education, which rule, so far as applicable to the case at bar, is as follows:

This rule was in force at the time plaintiff obtained her leave of absence. The compensation allowed teachers in the day school substitute class is much less than that which attached to the grade and position to which plaintiff had been elected.

Under this state of facts it is apparent that the case is parallel in its…