This appellant, an attorney at law, was charged by accusation before the superior court of the county of Sacramento with violating his obligations as an attorney, and after issue joined, upon a hearing, he was found guilty of the charges filed against him, and his license as a practicing attorney revoked. An appeal to this court being accorded by section 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the matter is now here for consideration.

The main charges against Wharton, as indicated by the accusation, may be briefly and substantially stated as follows :

The trial court found both of these charges made out by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; and that, these acts of the accused are amply sufficient to demand his discontinuance of the practice of the law there is no doubt.

The accused has brought the evidence of the trial here in bulk, and, after a careful perusal of it, we are entirely satisfied that the findings of the court are fully supported therein. The general reputation of the accused, and also that of the principal witness against him, were largely involved in the investigation. Again* the evidence upon various branches of the case was contradictory, and for this reason, as to the facts, the case was pre-eminently one for the trial judge, whose conclusions we would not readily disturb.

It is further insisted that the accusation filed against the accused contains a charge amounting to felony, and that recourse should first be had to the criminal courts for a trial of that charge before this proceeding could *370 be inaugurated. There is nothing in this contention. For a full consideration of this identical question we refer to Ex parte Tyler, 107 Cal. 78 . Neither is the accused entitled to a trial by jury. The statute (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 297) provides for a trial by the court, and the constitutionality of that section is beyond question. There are a few other matters urged by the appellant why this judgment should be reversed, but, after careful consideration, we consider them of minor importance, and wholly insufficient as grounds for a retrial of the cause.

Judgment affirmed.

Harrison, J., Henshaw, J., McFarland, J., and Temple, J., concurred.

Rehearing denied.